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I. THE "BIG CASE"
Antitrust.' Patent infringement.2 Civil rights.3 Employment
discrimination.4  And now, medical malpractice. The common
thread among each of these categories of cases is that judges and
advocates have, at one time or another, sought to elevate the
pleading requirements in federal court for these so-called "big
cases." To date, every such effort has failed.6 But none of the
previous attempts have garnered the wide range of support now
coming from such influential sources as the majority of physicians,
Congress, and the President of the United States.v
United States v. Employing Plasterer's Ass'n., 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954).
2 Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case", 21 F.R.D. 45, 48 (1957)
[hereinafter Clark, The Big Case].
3 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993).
4 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
' Clark, The Big Case, supra note 2, at 48. Big cases, under Judge Clark's definition, are
those cases that are costly, time-consuming, and perpetually motivate lawyers and
legislatures to abandon the simplified notice pleading requirements of the Federal Rules
without any appreciation for the history of heightened pleading and the overall design of the
Federal Rules. Id. at 45-48.
6 The U.S. Supreme Court has never affirmed attempts to require heightened pleading
beyond the few instances listed in Rule 9. See infra notes 208-28 and accompanying text. In
addition, Professor Charles Alan Wright noted as follows:
The modern philosophy of [notice] pleading has been received with general
approval and applied with success. Reviewing its operation, after 17
years' experience, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules said: "While
there has been some minority criticism, the consensus favors the rule and
the reported cases indicate that it has worked satisfactorily and has
advanced the administration ofjustice in the [federal] district courts."
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 68, at 473 (5th ed. 1994).
' The current crisis has garnered the attention of the U.S. General Accounting Office,
the Congressional Budget Office, the American Medical Association, the American Trial
Lawyer's Association, the President, Congress, and numerous state legislatures. Evidence
of each group's participation can be discerned from their various publications, speeches, and
websites. For a sampling, see generally JOINTECON. COMM. OFU.S. CONGRESS, LIABILITY FOR
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUES AND EVIDENCE (2003); U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING
TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (2004); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: EFFECTS OF VARYING LAwS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, MARYLAND AND
VIRGINIA (1999); Donald J. Palmisano, M.D., Will Your Physician Be There? The Medical
Liability Crisis in America, Keynote Speech to National Press Club (July 9, 2003) (transcript
on file with author); Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Calls for Medical
Liability Reform (Jan. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Bush Calls for Medical Liability Reform],
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040126-3.html; Assoc. of
Trial Lawyers of Am., Medical Malpractice Fibs and Facts, at httpJ/www.atla.org/Consumer
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In 1957, Judge Charles E. Clark observed that a mere twenty
years after the passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("Federal Rules"), noted jurists were attacking the minimal pleading
requirements established by Rule 8.8 While Judge Clark, the
principal architect of the Federal Rules and a longtime member of
the Advisory Committee on Federal Procedural Rules, recognized
that certain categories of cases burdened lawyers and courts with
great frequency, he still believed that pleading was not the appropri-
ate point at which to dispose of these taxing cases.9 Rather, only
those cases identified in Rule 9 merited heightened pleading. ° All
other cases could be sufficiently vetted using the discovery and
summary judgment procedures set forth in the Federal Rules." In
1957, Judge Clark was specifically referring to the onerous nature
of antitrust and patent infringement cases when he admonished:
I have spent a lifetime studying, teaching, and working
in this field and I assert dogmatically that strict special
pleading has never been found workable or even useful
in English and American law.
MediaResources/Tier3/press-room/FACTS/medmal/medmalfibsfacts.aspx (last visited Jan.
22, 2005).
Clark, The Big Case, supra note 2, at 48-53 (cataloguing various cases).
See Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1957) (lamenting "sad truth"
that such cases would likely "prove laborious" but stating special pleading is not remedy). In
1957, the same year Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), was decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court, Charles E. Clark, then Chief Judge for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, authored
Nagler. 248 F.2d at 321. Judge Clark explained in Nagler that the nuances of antitrust did
not justify displacing the pleading requirements of Rule 8. Id. at 326-27.
'o See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring particularity in pleading for fraud and mistake only).
n Clark, The Big Case, supra note 2, at 47-48. Judge Clark eloquently reminded that:
The function of the summary judgment motion as an adjunct of discovery
is well recognized. And finally the pre-trial conference carries the case
just as far as is possible in advance of the taking of testimony. These are
all definite steps toward trial committing the parties, as the pleadings
never do, to precise versions of facts so far as they can be developed
preliminarily. They thus have a degree of precision and finality that the
pleadings can never have. But even as useful as these devices are, hardly
anyone goes so far as to think of them as real substitutes for a trial which
must be had where grievances definitely separate the parties. It is
anomalous, particularly in the light of history and experience, that so
much more seems to be expected of the paper pleadings than of these
useful and highly practical adjuncts to trial.
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Now it is clear that in federal pleading no special
exceptions have been created for the "Big Case" or for
any other particular type of action.
Notwithstanding this background there seems now to
be developing something bordering on a revolt led by
some of the most distinguished of my colleagues .... I
am not able to appraise quite how extensive the move-
ment is; but in view of the powerful names already
enlisted, it is certainly not to be lightly dismissed. But
I must confess to disappointment that there is not more
analysis of the intent of the rules and quite no discussion
of the precedents.2
Our country is in the middle of a similar predicament-a medical
malpractice crisis that is influencing, and attempting to alter, the
rules of pleading in federal court. Essentially, doctors and their
advocates assert that without stiff and immediate limitations on
medical malpractice litigation, doctors will be unable to afford the
escalating costs of medical malpractice insurance coverage and will
eventually be "run out of town" or at least out of business, leaving
many of us without the aid of a physician when we need medical
care.13 Although many reforms have already been enacted, those
12 Id. at 47-49 (emphasis added).
18 Doctors and their representatives have appeared before Congress alerting government
officials that if medical malpractice premiums continue to rise without restraint, many
physicians will either leave their specialties or leave their communities. The Medical
Liability Crisis and Its Impact on Patient Care: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108 Cong. 1, 3 (2004) (statement of George F. Lee, M.D., for American Hospital
Association); Dying for Help: Are Patients Needlessly Suffering Due to the High Cost of
Medical Liability Insurance?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights & Wellness
of the Comm. on Gov't Reform, 108th Cong. 4-6 (2003) (statement of Sherman Joyce, President
of American Tort Reform Association). Thus, many rural areas risk losing medical care in
certain high-risk specialties such as obstetrics. Further evidence of the growing rift between
plaintiffs lawyers and physicians is the recent proposal debated by the American Medical
Association that physicians should not be required to treat plaintiffs lawyers or their family
members except in emergencies. Keith Griffin, You're a Paralegal Where? Sorry, the Doctor
Is Out, CONN. L. TRIB., July 15, 2004, at http://www.law.comljsp/article.jsp?id=108931503
3510; Laura Parker, Medical-Malpractice Battle Gets Personal, USA TODAY, June 14, 2004,
at 1A. The "no treatment" controversy has generated a host of criticism and editorials
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challenging the reforms assert that medical malpractice continues
to occur and that victims continue to need access to a forum for
judicial relief.'4 Without seeking to embrace or advance the merits
of either camp's arguments, this Article will instead seek to respond
to the residual quandary posed by the current national crisis-how
pleading requirements in medical malpractice cases are infringing
upon the Federal Rules in diversity actions.
While Judge Clark would have had no trouble applying the
traditional "short and plain" pleading requirements of Rule 8 to
perceived "big cases" like medical malpractice, various lower courts
seem divided on whether requiring additional information from
prospective medical malpractice plaintiffs in federal court comports
or conflicts with Rule 8's mandate of notice pleading. 5 And true to
Judge Clark's 1957 trepidation, these decisions are seemingly being
written without adequate "analysis of the intent of the rules and...
discussion of the precedents."" The issue of heightened pleading in
medical malpractice actions becomes relevant not in state
cases-where state procedural rules clearly apply-but, rather, in
federal diversity actions where Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
instructs courts to apply state substantive law and federal proce-
dural requirements. 7 Thus, a key question becomes whether
heightened pleading in medical malpractice cases amounts to a
substantive requirement or a procedural burden. With every state
legislature that passes some form of heightened pleading require-
ment, the question described herein assumes greater urgency.
Because there are very few instances where medical malpractice
issues arise under federal statute, 8 invariably, the majority of
challenging the proposal.
14 CONG. BUDGETOFFICE, TaE ECONOMICS OFU.S. ToRT LIABILTY23,30(2003), available
at httpJ/www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/46xx/doc4641/10-22-TortReform-Study.pdf.
15 See infra notes 104-52 and accompanying text.
16 Clark, The Big Case, supra note 2, at 49.
17 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,465 (1965) (noting that
"[the broad command of Erie was therefore identical to that of the Enabling Act: federal
courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law").
"8 The main exception continues to be the Federal Tort Claims Act, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-2680 (2000). Two cases grappling with the issue of state pleading requirements in
medical malpractice cases brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act are Oslund v. United
States, 701 F. Supp. 710, 713-14 (D. Minn. 1988) (interpreting Minnesota's malpractice
statute as applied to Vietnam veteran), and Hill v. United States, 751 F. Supp. 909, 910 (D.
976 [Vol. 39:971
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medical malpractice cases filed in federal court will enter via
diversity jurisdiction. Thus, while doctors and plaintiffs lawyers
debate the finer points of the medical malpractice crisis, this Article
focuses on resolving the impending Erie question regarding
heightened pleading in federally filed medical malpractice actions.
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the medical
malpractice crisis and its impact on litigation. Part III evaluates
the proffered solution-heightened pleading-and assesses the
various approaches taken by federal courts in resolving the Erie
issue presented by heightened pleading. Part IV critiques the
proffered solution from the perspective of history, the Federal Rules,
and precedent. In doing so, Part IV will trace the evolution of notice
pleading and underscore the lasting and unchanging nature of Rule
8 from Dioguardi9 to Conley2" to Leatherman2 to Swierkiewicz.22
Finally, Part V offers an improved solution to the medical malprac-
tice crisis that more fully addresses the concerns of overburdened
physicians while more closely meeting the equally important needs
of injured patients and keeping intact the important procedural
design of the Federal Rules. For now, it appears the "big case" is
once again upon us.
II. BAD MEDICINE: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND
HEIGHTENED PLEADING
In the mid-1950s, the United States grappled with a perceived
litigation crisis: How, from a societal perspective, do we deal with
expensive and time consuming lawsuits?2" Proponents of height-
ened pleading sought to require something more from pleadings
Colo. 1990) (evaluating application of Colorado's malpractice statute to parents of child
injured in Army hospital care).
" Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
20 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
21 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163 (1993).
22 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
23 See generally Clark, The Big Case, supra note 2 (discussing movement for heightened
pleading requirements in some cases but empahisizing importance of pretrial discovery or
conference to compensate for "lack of detail" in complaint).
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than was envisioned under the Federal Rules.24 The perceived crisis
purportedly called for deviation from the norm. Ultimately,
however, no such deviation occurred.26
Fast forward fifty years and the reverberations of crisis once
again emanate throughout the country. Today, doctors and lawyers
24 Id. at 48.
25 Id.
' Id. at 53-54. Judge Clark attached as an appendix to his article the 1955 Advisory
Committee Note relating to Rule 8(a)(2). This Note was prepared during the height of the
criticism calling for heightened pleading in difficult and costly cases. The Note, while long,
bears repeating in full here to underscore the allegiance that the Advisory Committee felt
toward notice pleading in the face of stiff challenge.
Note. Rule 8(a)(2) is retained in its present form. This Note is appended
to it in answer to various criticisms and suggestions for amendment which
have been presented to the Committee.
The criticisms appear to be based on the view that the rule does not
require the averment of any information as to what has actually hap-
pened. That Rule 8(a) envisages the statement of the circumstances,
occurrences, and events in support of the claim presented is clearly
indicated not only by the forms appended to the rules showing what
should be considered as sufficient compliance with the rule, but also by
other intermeshing rules; see, inter alia, Rules 8(c) and (e), 9(b-g), 10(b),
12(b)(6), 12(h), 15(c), 20 and 54(b). Rule 12(e), providing for a motion for
a more definite statement, also shows that the complaint must disclose
information with sufficient definiteness. The intent and effect of the rules
is to permit the claim to be stated in general terms; the rules are designed
to discourage battles over mere form of statement and to sweep away the
needless controversies which the codes permitted that served either to
delay trial on the merits or to prevent a party from having a trial because
of mistakes in statement. The decision in Dioguardi v. Durning, 2 Cir.,
1944, 139 F.2d 774, [sic] to which proponents of an amendment to Rule
8(a) have especially referred, was not based on any holding that a pleader
is not required to supply information disclosing a ground for relief. The
complaint in that case stated a plethora of facts and the court so construed
them as to sustain the validity of the pleading.
While there has been some minority criticism, the consensus favors the
rule and the reported cases indicated that it has worked satisfactorily and
has advanced the administration ofjustice in the district courts. The rule
has been adopted verbatim by a number of states in framing their own
rules of court procedure. This circumstance appears to the Committee to
confirm its view that no change in the rule is required or justified.
It is accordingly the opinion of the Advisory Committee that, as it
stands, the rule adequately sets forth the characteristics of good pleading;
does away with the confusion resulting from the use of "facts" and "cause
of action"; and requires the pleader to disclose adequate information as
the basis of his claim for relief as distinguished from a bare averment that
he wants relief and is entitled to it.
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are battling inside and outside the courtroom to resolve a perceived
medical malpractice crisis. There is strong and unyielding rhetoric
on both sides. The uproar even has Congress and the President
calling for reforms. Yet the empirical research guiding these
reforms has not produced consistent results.2"
Federally compiled data confirms that medical malpractice
lawsuits accounted for 7.4% of all federal cases during the 1996-97
fiscal year.29 In 2001, the Department of Justice confirmed that 90%
2 See supra note 7. While delivering a speech in Little Rock, Arkansas, President Bush
emphatically stressed the need for medical malpractice liability reform. Bush Calls for
Medical Liability Reform, supra note 7. The following are excerpts from his speech:
I'm here to talk about one of the reasons why health care costs are going
up. And that's the fact that we've got too many darn lawsuits, too many
frivolous and junk lawsuits that are affecting people. I'm here to make
sure that we talk in a way that says to the people of Arkansas and
America that we need medical liability reform to make sure that medicine
is affordable and available.
These are good steps. Yet one of the main cost drivers that has nothing
to do with what happens in an operating room or a waiting room-happen
in the courtroom. One of the reasons people are finding their premiums
are up, and it's hard to find a doc these days, is because frivolous and junk
lawsuits are threatening medicine across the country. And there's a lot
of them, people just filing these suits. I call them junk suits because they
don't have any merit. The problem is they cost money to fight.
Id.
28 Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New
Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 57,58-59. Professor Danzon explains
that [t )o date, there have been only two published statistical analyses of the impact of tort
reform and other factors on malpractice claims." Id. at 58. Thereafter, she admonishes that
"[gliven the recent rise in claims and severity as well as the necessarily less-than-definitive
nature of previous analyses, the time is ripe for additional information." Id. at 59. See also
Stephen Zuckerman et al., Information on Malpractice: A Review of Empirical Research on
Major Policy Issues, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 85, 85 (noting that "[elven
a casual follower of malpractice policy debates can see that the amount of published and
unpublished information is voluminous: however, very little of that information consists of
systematic empirical studies"); cf Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the
"Litigation Explosion,'"Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982,982 (2003) (examining use ofSummary
Judgment and Motion to Dismiss to resolve disputes in federal courts that would be better
left to juries). While ultimately concluding that little empirical research has been conducted
to verify the fears behind the proposed litigation crisis, Miller notes that "[slome empirical
evidence indicates that awards in tort cases have increased significantly and that the number
of million-dollar awards has risen sharply over a thirty-year period, most dramatically in the
area[ ] of medical malpractice." Id. at 988.
' U.S. Dep't of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Tort Trials and Verdicts,
1996-97, at 3 (1999), available at httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubpdffttv97.pdf. The
Department of Justice statistical analysis states that "vehicle claims comprised 19.4% oftort
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of all medical malpractice cases sought compensation for death or
permanent injury. 0 Yet only 27% of patients pursuing medical
malpractice claims were ultimately successful in their cases.31 This
figure is much lower than the success rate of other tort litigants,
who succeeded in federal court at a rate of 52%.32 Nevertheless, the
reality of the current state of medicine is replete with instances of
doctors who refuse to perform vital medical services, such as
delivering babies, because of the fear of the resulting monetary
judgments that even the smallest of errors could produce.33
Without seeking to place any value judgment on the current
debate, we accept as factual that many individuals are injured each
year as a result of medical treatment, and out of this larger
category, some individuals sue based upon their injuries. Thus,
trial cases, product liability 15.9%, and medical malpractice 7.4%." Id.
30 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS
ANDVERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/mmtvlC01.pdf.
31 Id.
32 Id. "The overall win rate for medical malpractice plaintiffs (27%) was about halfof that
found among plaintiffs in all tort trials (52%)." Id. This data is consistent with the 1986
Harvard Medical Practice Study investigating medical malpractice in the State of New York.
PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993). This extensive empirical study reviewed
health care costs, health care injuries, and the role of medical malpractice litigation in New
York. The authors extrapolated their data on iatrogenic, or medically related, injury to
conclude the following:
Several findings from this study are worthy of emphasis. First is
disclosure of the overall magnitude of mortality and morbidity produced
by iatrogenic injury. In New York in 1984 almost 100,000 injuries
occurred as a result of adverse events, and more than a quarter of those
were caused by substandard care. These numbers are even more striking
when compared with other important sources of accidents in this country.
This is especially true of the fatality rate. If New York's adverse-event-
related death total can be extrapolated to the U.S. population as a whole,
one would estimate over 150,000 iatrogenic fatalities annually, more than
half of which are due to negligence. Medical injury, then, accounts for
more deaths than all other types of accidents combined, and dwarfs the
mortality rates associated with motor vehicle accidents (50,000 deaths per
year) and occupation-related mishaps (6,000 deaths per year).
Id. at 55.
' Thomas D. Rowley, High Insurance Premiums Jeopardize Rural OBs, 9 RURALHEALTH
NEwS 1 (2002), available at httpJ/www.nal.usda.gov/ricrichstsprsum02.htm (last visited Jan.
27, 2005) (noting that at 2002 press conference, American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists "named nine 'Red Alert' States where the medical liability insurance situation
threatens the availability of physicians to deliver babies").
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while the true underlying crisis invokes traditional tort law, of
which medical malpractice litigation is merely a subset, the debate
remains multifaceted and requires further empirical data before it
can be properly resolved.
Casual observers will note a pattern of medical malpractice crises
in this country.34 Three times during the past forty years, medical
malpractice litigation has reached crisis levels. During the 1970s," 5
3' Glen 0. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49
LAw& CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 5,5. Professor Robinson's comments regarding the
1970s medical malpractice crisis ring true in today's volatile litigation climate:
Renewed increases in the severity (size) and frequency (number) of
malpractice claims, accompanied by new increases in insurance premi-
ums, are now causing fresh anxiety within the medical profession. New
proposals for legal reform have included not only a myriad of bills in state
legislatures--only a handful of which have been enacted to date-but also
two bills in Congress. The renewed interest in the problem makes timely
another look at the crisis of the 1970's and the legal and insurance
changes it produced.
Id. at 6.
35 WEILER ETAL., supra note 32, at 3. The authors observed:
Medical liability costs began to rise sharply in the late 1960s, leading the
Nixon administration to appoint a national commission to analyze the
problem. The commission's report, issued in 1973, was decidedly
nonalarmist in tone. Its basic verdict was that doctors did not need
special legal protection not afforded to other tort defendants. But the ink
was barely dry on the commission's report when the country's first
malpractice "crisis" emerged in the mid-1970s, with premium levels
doubling in just three years. Numerous states, including New York,
responded with legislation that favored doctors with a variety of measures
in malpractice litigation. In the immediate aftermath of this legislative
effort the malpractice insurance market stabilized, with real premiums
increasing quite slowly for the next several years. Unfortunately that
equilibrium did not hold. A second equally severe malpractice crisis
occurred in the mid-1980's, with premium levels again doubling in just
three years.
Id. See also Robinson, supra note 34, at 6. Professor Robinson explains that:
The malpractice crisis of the mid-1970's has several facets. For health
care providers the immediate crisis was essentially two-fold: a sudden
and substantial increase in malpractice insurance premiums rates and,
worse, the threat that liability coverage would become unavailable at any
price as a consequence of carrier withdrawal from the field. For the
carriers themselves, the crisis was an unanticipated increase in both the
number of claims filed for negligent injuries and the amounts recovered.
Rising underwriting costs were compounded by investment losses that a
nationwide recession inflicted on insurance companies along with other
investors.
982 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:971
1980s,36 and again most recently during the late 1990s 37 and early
twenty-first century,38 commentators have noted that medical
malpractice litigation and its attendant expenditures have placed an
unacceptable onus on doctors. Each crisis has led to reforms. 39 No
reform, however, has yet forestalled future crises. The "big case"
appears to persist without solution or cure.
State legislatures intent on averting full-blown medical malprac-
tice crises within their communities have begun to mandate
heightened pleading requirements in medical malpractice cases.4 °
This legislation continues without due regard for history or due
regard for the general principles of tort law. Legislatures are,
perhaps unintentionally, creating potential substantive immunities
through the manipulation of procedural requirements.
36 See Danzon, supra note 28, at 57 ('Claim severity increased faster than the rate of
inflation throughout the 1970's, and this trend appears to have continued into the 1980's.");
see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 1 (explaining in report delivered to
Honorable Dick Armey that "[iln both the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, medical malpractice
insurance premiums grew significantly, causing the medical profession to be alarmed by a
crisis in the affordability and availability of [malpractice] insurance").
" Elizabeth Anne Keith, Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services of Richmond, Inc.:
Reconsidering the Standard of Review and Constitutionality of Virginia's Medical Malpractice
Cap, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 587, 589 (2000).
' John Conyers, Jr., The Health Act: A Bad Prescription for Consumers, 27 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 191, 198-200 (2003).
39 WEILER ET AL., supra note 32, at 6-7. The authors observed in finalizing their report
that:
The sense of crisis that recurrently overtakes the malpractice system is,
not surprisingly, also felt by state politicians. In New York and elsewhere
in the country, significant legislative changes have been enacted in an
effort to alleviate the problems felt by doctors with malpractice litigation.
Waves of such legislative activity occurred initially in 1975-76 and then
again in 1985-86, coinciding with the peak points in the premium spiral.
These statutory changes addressed numerous facets of each of the three
distinct components of the overall malpractice regime. One component is
the liability insurance system, which has generated the sharply increased
premium bills to hospitals and doctors needed to cover the large liability
costs incurred by providers to their patients. The second component is the
tort litigation process, which determines which injured patients will be
able to collect on their tort claims and how much compensation successful
claimants will receive. The third major component is the health care
system itself, in which patients are looked after by doctors and other
providers, and in which the treatment occasionally exacerbates rather
than ameliorates the patient's condition, consequently moving some
patients to seek legal and monetary relief.
Id.
0 See infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
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As a general rule, tort litigation seeks to attain two equally
important goals: compensation to injured parties and deterrence
against negligent behavior. The American tort system has often
been criticized as inefficient, costly, and ineffective.4' And yet, many
products are improved and risky behavior curtailed through tort
litigation." In the medical malpractice arena, the goals of tort
litigation remain unchanged: Compensation must be delivered to
injured patients, which simultaneously serves to deter physicians
from engaging in negligent behavior.4" Any proposed
reforms-procedural or substantive-must preserve these aims.
Despite the many calls for protection against frivolous medical
malpractice lawsuits, medical malpractice is merely a subset of tort
law. Tinkering with the protections afforded under general
principles of tort doctrine risks immunizing an entire community
from the consequences of their negligent acts, while also creating a
disfavored group of litigants. This is a cure that, at best, re-injures.
In the end, the inquiry is rather simple: Does the current
medical malpractice crisis justify deviations from the procedural
norm? Is medical malpractice so unique that it requires exceptional
treatment, different from all other "big cases"? Has Rule 8 finally
met its match? One thing seems certain: Were Judge Clark alive
today, he would undoubtedly proclaim that no crisis looms large
enough to discard the time-honored and time-tested Federal Rules.
Any such prescription must surely be deemed bad medicine.
III. THE PROFFERED SOLUTION: AMENDING STATE
PLEADING RULES
A. STATE STATUTE VARIATIONS WITH A COMMON RESULT
In response to the arguably mounting medical malpractice crisis,
numerous states have enacted legislation in an attempt to curb
41 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 14, at 11, 21; Edward T. Schroeder, A Tort by Any
Other Name? In Search of the Distinction Between Regulation Through Litigation and
Conventional Tort Law, 83 TEx. L. REV. 897, 897-99 (2005).
42 DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 34-35 (2004).
43 Frank A. Sloan & Stephen S. van Wert, Cost and Compensation of Injuries in Medical
Malpractice, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring 1991, at 131, 131.
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frivolous lawsuits that burden the judicial system. Many of the
enacted laws heighten the standard of pleading required to bring a
medical malpractice action into state court." As noted by one
state's legislature, the purpose behind such tort reform legislation
is "to discourage unjustified medical malpractice lawsuits and
reduce the costs of the medical malpractice liability system, thus
helping to contain spiraling health care costs, stem the flight of
physicians out of [the state], and assure the citizens ... access to
affordable health care."45  Another state's highest court has
recognized that its medical malpractice statute serves "to alleviate
the high cost of medical negligence claims through early determina-
tion and prompt resolution of claims."46
While such laws have developed rapidly, special pleading laws
are difficult to find because they often do not appear among a
section of statutes devoted to special pleading standards, and there
are few cross-references that provide guidance. 47  Rather, the
heightened pleading laws for medical malpractice actions are
scattered throughout the various state statutes in whatever manner
they were presented to their respective state legislatures.48 For
example, the heightened pleading statutes developed in North
Dakota,49 Illinois,5" Georgia,5 and North Carolina 2 are each found
" See infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text. In addition to the heightened pleading
statutory requirements, other efforts have been made to reduce frivolous medical malpractice
claims. For example, in Louisiana and Nebraska plaintiffs may not bring an action against
a health care provider until a claimant's proposed complaint is reviewed by a medical review
panel and such panel has issued an opinion. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West Supp.
2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2840 (1998 & Supp. 2002).
' Ericson v. Pollack, 110 F. Supp. 2d 582, 586 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (quoting position paper
analyzing Senate Bill 270, which became applicable statute, to explain legislative intent
behind Michigan's affidavit of merit statute).
4' Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993).
47 Jeffrey A. Parness et al., The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading Laws,
78 NEB. L. REV. 412, 438-39 (1999).
48 Id. at 418-19 (noting specific location of statutes from Florida, Illinois, Texas,
Minnesota, Missouri, and North Carolina).
49 N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (2003).
60 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 2003).
51 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1993 & Supp. 2004).
52 N.C. R. CIv. P. 9(j). The rule requires that a medical malpractice claim be dismissed
unless the pleading (1) specifically asserts that a person reasonably expected to qualify as an
expert has reviewed the medical care given and is willing to testify that it did not meet the
required standard of care; (2) specifically asserts that a person who the claimant will try to
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within their respective state's statutory section devoted to civil
procedure, while Colorado's statute53 is located in the laws concern-
ing courts and court procedure. On the other hand, heightened
pleading statutes from Florida,54 Missouri,55 and New Jersey56 are
embedded within the sections regarding torts, particularly those
involving medical malpractice, while Nevada's law57 is within a
statutory section devoted solely to actions for malpractice. Finally,
Minnesota" and Oklahoma's59 heightened pleading statutes are
found among the states' public health provisions, while Michigan's
law6" is within the revised judicature act. Regardless of each law's
location, however, the result is the same: a more stringent and
heightened level of pleading in order to achieve a reduced number
of frivolous lawsuits plaguing the judicial system.
1. Timing Variations. While state legislatures often have the
same goal in mind when arriving at statutory remedies to the
medical malpractice crisis, they differ significantly in their ap-
proaches and ultimate resulting solutions. Thus, state heightened
pleading statutes vary not only by their location within state
statutory schemes, but also in their timing requirements. 61 For
use as part of her expert testimony by motion is willing to testify that the medical care did
not reach the appropriate standard of care and the motion is filed with the complaint; and
(3) alleges facts giving rise to negligence under res ipsa loquitur. Id. In 2001, the Court of
Appeals of North Carolina declared Rule 9(j) to be both unconstitutional and void because it
was not the least restrictive means for the state to achieve its purported interest in
preventing frivolous lawsuits. Anderson v. Assimos, 553 S.E.2d 63, 68-69 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001). The court found that because Rule 9(j) 'classifies malpractice actions into two groups:
medical and non-medical," the equal protection clause was implicated. Id. at 68. However,
one year later, the Supreme Court of North Carolina vacated the lower court's opinion that
Rule 9(j) was unconstitutional. Anderson v. Assimos, 572 S.E.2d 101, 103 (N.C. 2002). On
appeal, the Supreme Court found that Rule 9(j) only applies to 'medical malpractice cases
where the plaintiff seeks to prove that the defendant's conduct breached the requisite
standard of care-not res ipsa loquitur claims." Id. Because the plaintiffs claim asserted
only res ipsa loquitur, Rule 9(j) was not triggered, and the lower court erred in addressing
Rule 9(j)'s constitutionality. Id.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (2002).
54 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005).
- MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.225 (West 2000).
'6 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000).
17 NEV. REV. STAT. 41A.071 (2003).
58 MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2002).
'9 OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1E (2001).
60 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912b (West 2000).
61 Parness et al., supra note 47, at 419.
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example, a Michigan statute requires that before a plaintiff may
bring a medical malpractice action the plaintiff must give the health
care provider written notice at least 182 days before actually filing
the claim.62 New Jersey's heightened pleading statute, on the other
hand, requires that in a medical malpractice or negligence action
the plaintiff must provide an expert affidavit acknowledging a
reasonable probability of negligence to each defendant within sixty
days after the filing of defendant's answer." States such as Georgia
and Oklahoma require an expert affidavit to simultaneously
accompany the plaintiffs complaint at the time of filing or service
of the medical malpractice action.6"
In RTC v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey relied on the sixty-day delay for
submission of an expert affidavit as "strongly suggest [ing]" that the
New Jersey statute is completely unrelated to pleading.6" In
reviewing Colorado's heightened pleading statute,66 which also
provides a sixty-day grace period after service of the complaint upon
defendant in which to file an expert affidavit, the Tenth Circuit
failed to even discuss the statutory affidavit requirement's effect of
raising pleading standards, presumably because of the gap in time
62 Id. at 417-18 (explaining comprehensive requirements under Michigan's statute).
63 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (Supp.
2003) (allowing sixty-day delay after service); MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2002) (allowing ninety
days after service); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225 (West 2000) (allowing ninety days after filing);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (2003) (allowing three months after commencement of action).
64 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1993 & Supp. 2004) (providing exception to contemporaneous filing
when there is good faith belief that statute of limitations will expire within ten days of filing
complaint, requiring that expert affidavit supplement pleadings within forty-five days of
original filing); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1E (2001) (allowing court to grant extension of
time, not to exceed ninety days after filing of petition except for good cause shown, to meet
affidavit filing requirements); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004)
(granting ninety-day extension of statute of limitations when complaint filed to allow attorney
to conduct reasonable investigation to determine whether grounds for good faith belief of
negligence exists); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 2003) (requiring affidavit to
accompany complaint that states afflant consulted qualified and competent health care
professional and that professional believes there is meritorious cause of action); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
3012-a (Consol. 1991) (requiring attorney to execute certificate of merit upon filing action or
to file such certificate within ninety days if action would otherwise be barred by statute of
limitations).
65 RTC Mortgage Trust v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 981 F. Supp. 334, 343 (D.N.J. 1997).
66 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (Supp. 2003).
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between service and the expert affidavit deadline. 7 Similarly, the
Eighth Circuit applied North Dakota's statute, which allows a
plaintiff three months from commencement of an action to obtain an
expert affidavit, in federal court without so much as noting the
ramifications under the Federal Rules of bestowing an extra burden
on initiating the lawsuit.68 The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia, however, recognized that the Georgia statute
requiring an expert affidavit to be attached with the complaint "in
effect mandates the pleading of evidentiary material."69 Thus,
federal courts sitting in diversity have utilized the statutory
variations in timing requirements for submission of expert affidavits
to justify determinations both for and against applying the particu-
lar state statute in federal court.
2. Other Substantive Variations. State heightened pleading
standards also vary in their substantive approaches and require-
ments. For example, some states, including Georgia and New
Jersey, require that the accompanying affidavit emanate from an
appropriately licensed person or an expert competent to testify.7 °
Other states, such as Colorado and Florida, require a certificate of
counsel stating that, after a reasonable investigation, the attorney
believes there is a good faith ground for bringing the malpractice
lawsuit.71  Illinois's statute specifically requires an affidavit
declaring that the affiant has discussed the case with a "health
professional" who has "determined in a written report, after a
review of the medical record and other relevant material
involved.., that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for the
filing of such action." Thus, each state's heightened pleading
statute contains not only different technical requirements, but also
unique substantive requirements such as varying requirements for
67 See Trierweilerv. Croxton& Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523,1540 (l0thCir. 1996)
(discussing instead possibility of direct collision between Colorado statute and Federal Rule
11).
68 Weasel v. St. Alexius Med. Ctr., 230 F.3d 348, 353 (8th Cir. 2000).
69 Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609, 611 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
70 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1993 & Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000).
71 COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-20-602 (Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (West Supp.
2004).
72 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 2003).
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who serves as the affiant and what information must be contained
in the submitted affidavit.
Whether the above state statutes (1) are discovered in the state's
civil pleading rules, the statutes governing torts and medical
malpractice, or the laws governing public healthcare; (2) allow for
a sixty day delay or require immediate filing of an expert affidavit;
or (3) demand that the affidavit be from an expert competent to
testify at trial, from the complainant, or from the plaintiffs
attorney, each is an attempt to raise the requisite level of pleading
necessary to bring an action for medical malpractice. Because these
statutes essentially serve as amendments to pleading, a special
analysis is required to determine whether such statutes can or
should be applied in instances when a federal court is sitting in
diversity.
B. FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETATIONS WITH AN UNCOMMON RESULT
Despite the state statutes' common result of heightening the
standard of pleading in medical malpractice actions, federal courts
have considered such statutes' applicability in federal court with
varying results.7 Most federal courts at least recognize that the
proper determination for whether a state statute even applies in
federal court stems from an analysis under the Erie Doctrine.74 In
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,7" the U.S. Supreme Court over-
turned its previous decision in Swift v. Tyson, which had essentially
allowed federal courts to create their own federal common law in
cases of diversity if the area was not explicitly covered by a state
statute.76 The Erie Court held that "[tihere is no federal general
common law."7 Rather, federal courts should apply state law in
substantive areas of a diversity action, unless the area is governed
73 See infra notes 104-52 and accompanying text.
7' E.g., Braddock v. Orlando Reg'l Health Care Sys. Inc., 881 F. Supp. 580,582 (M.D. Fla.
1995) (recognizing need to confront conflict between federal and state law and citing Erie
Doctrine that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply substantive law of forum state);
Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609, 610 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (same).
7' 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
'6 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (holding for nearly one hundred years that local state
courts decisions would be respected, but not binding, in federal court diversity actions).
7' Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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by the U.S. Constitution or an act of Congress.7" Alternatively, in
matters of procedure, federal courts should apply federal procedural
law.
79
Since the famed Erie decision in 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court
has further clarified, and sometimes muddied, ° the question of
when state law should be applied in federal court in a body of law
now referred to as the "Erie Doctrine." Several years after Erie was
decided, the Supreme Court stated that its intent in Erie was to
ensure that "the outcome of litigation in the federal court should be
substantially the same ... as it would if tried in a State court."8"
Thus, in York, the Supreme Court developed an outcome-determina-
tion test that favored vertical uniformity over horizontal
uniformity.8 2 Vertical uniformity, achieving the same results
whether the litigants are in state or federal court, could best be
achieved by applying state substantive law in federal courts while
limiting application of federal law to issues of procedure. 3 Although
the ultimate goal of such application of laws was clearly to achieve
uniformity of outcomes in federal and state court actions, the
Supreme Court later clarified in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative that outcome-determination is not the only consider-
ation. 4 Rather, upon determining whether to apply state or federal
law, a court should also consider whether there are "affirmative
7' Id. at 74.
'9 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
so See Robert K Harris, Brown v. Nichols: The Eleventh Circuit Refuses to Play the Erie
Game with Georgia's ExpertAffidavit Requirement, 29 GA. L. REV. 291, 291 (1994) ("'[I]fthere
has been a spell cast by these Erie incantations ... it has produced more befuddlement than
enchantment.'" (alteration in original) (quoting J. Aron & Co. v. Serv. Transp. Co., 515 F.
Supp. 428, 435 n.8 (D. Md. 1981))).
"' See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109-11 (1945) (holding that state statute of
limitation laws should be applied in federal courts because of such laws' ability to affect
outcome of litigation in federal court).
s2 See Jed I. Bergman, Note, Putting Precedent in Its Place: Stare Decisis and Federal
Predictions of State Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 980 n.60 (1996) (noting that Erie sacrificed
horizontal unity among federal courts in return for vertical uniformity between state and
federal courts).
m See York, 326 U.S. at 109 (indicating that determination of whether state law is
substantive or procedural under Erie analysis should be informed by policy of vertical
uniformity).
'4 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958) (holding that federal preference for jury trial should be
applied over state rule allowing judge to determine factual issues in federal diversity action).
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countervailing considerations at work." 5 The Byrd Court specifi-
cally determined that the federal preference for a jury trial to
determine issues of fact exists as an affirmative countervailing
interest to mandate its application in federal diversity actions over
a state's rule allowing a judge to determine issues of fact. 6
Perhaps the Erie Doctrine was most significantly enhanced by
the explanation given in Hanna v. Plumer,8 7 when the Supreme
Court announced the "twin aims of the Erie rule [as] [1] discourage-
ment of forum-shopping and [21 the avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws."8 While ultimately reiterating that Erie
"has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule,"89 the Supreme
Court created a twofold test to guide courts in their quest to
determine the correct application of federal or state law.9 ° The first
prong of the Erie test reminds courts that the design behind Erie's
goal of vertical uniformity is to prohibit forum-shopping by
litigants.9' In other words, if federal courts correctly apply state
substantive law in federal diversity actions, litigants will not file in
the location where they perceive an outcome will be more favorable
to their cause because the outcomes should be nearly the same
regardless of the locale.92 The second prong of Hanna's test
underscores the notion that Erie does not intend to result in the
application of a law that "would make so important a difference to
the character or result of the litigation that failure to enforce it
would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State."93
Rather, the second aim of Erie is to ensure uniformity of treatment
"5 Id. at 537.
86 Id. at 537-38.
87 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (applying Rule 4(d)(1) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure over
local state service rules in federal diversity action); see also Alan Ides, The Supreme Court
and the Law to Be Applied in Diversity Cases: A Critical Guide to the Development and
Application of the Erie Doctrine and Related Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19,56 (1995) ("Next to Erie,
Hanna is the court's most important decision in this realm, largely because it reestablishes
the primacy of legitimate federal law and provides a coherent method for assessing the
legitimacy of that law.").
88 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
89 Id. at 470.
9o Id. at 468.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 468 n.9.
93 Id.
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in state and federal court, thereby preventing an undue advantage
obtained by proceeding in federal court."4
In addition to providing the twin aims of Erie, the Supreme Court
instructed in Hanna that when a Federal Rule would govern a
situation in the absence of the state law at issue, federal courts are
to apply the Federal Rule.95 Adhering to Erie's broad rule that
federal law should govern procedural issues in federal court, the
Hanna Court determined that Rule 4 applied in federal diversity
actions rather than the state service of process law.96
While the twin aims of Erie articulated in Hanna gave clearer
direction to lower federal courts, the Supreme Court has continu-
ously confronted Erie questions during the past twenty-five years.
In 1980, the Walker Court clarified that when determining whether
a federal rule or statute already encompasses the area at issue, the
federal law should be interpreted according to its "plain meaning. ""
In other words, the Walker Court indicated that courts should follow
a textualist interpretation of federal rules and statutes in order to
avoid overly narrow interpretations of federal law that tend to result
in the incorrect application of a state law.9" Thus, the Court
reiterated the importance of applying federal law when an area is
plainly governed by the U.S. Constitution or acts of Congress.99 In
1988 the Ricoh Court, as described by Professor Allen Ides, taught
lower courts the lesson "that a federal procedural statute trumps
contrary state law in a diversity case so long as the federal statute
is designed to apply to the circumstances and so long as the federal
statute can be classified as procedural. " 1°' Although the Supreme
Court revisited Erie in 1996,11 arguably giving additional guidance
to its Erie jurisprudence,0 2 Professor Ides' description of the Ricoh
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
9 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
96 Id. at 473-74.
17 Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980).
98 See id. (stating that Federal Rules should not necessarily be interpreted narrowly to
avoid direct conflict with state law).
9 See id. at 748 (noting that Hanna's holding applies where Federal Rule is clearly
applicable and within Congress' rulemaking power).
10o Ides, supra note 87, at 77 (commenting on Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22
(1988)).
101 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438 (1996).
102 See Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L.
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decision, supplemented by the preceding cases, essentially sets forth
the proper formula for federal courts when determining whether to
apply state heightened pleading statutes in federal medical
malpractice diversity actions. °3 Nevertheless, lower courts have
varied in their results under Erie upon such determinations.
For example, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan applied Michigan's affidavit of merit statute without any
real analysis of whether the Erie doctrine mandates or even permits
application of the state law in federal court.0 4 Conversely, more
than one U.S. district court in Georgia has carefully considered the
issue of whether Georgia's state law, which requires an expert
affidavit to accompany a medical malpractice complaint,0 5 governs
in federal court.'0 6 In Boone v. Knight, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia traced the law handed down in Erie
and its progeny and concluded that Georgia's statute has no place
in federal diversity actions.' 7 The Boone court reasoned that
Georgia's statute, located in the state's civil procedure code, "is
REV. 1637, 1663 (1998) (noting that Gasperini has not provided additional guidance to
Supreme Court's Erie jurisprudence, but rather, has created more questions than answers).
" See Dace A. Caldwell, Medical Malpractice Gets Eerie, The Erie Implications of
Heightened Pleading Burden in Oklahoma, 57 OKLA. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2005)
(providing an in-depth Erie analysis that federal courts should follow when deciding whether
to apply state heightened pleading statute in federal court).
104 Ericson v. Pollack, 110 F. Supp. 2d 582, 586-87 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
105 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2004) reads:
(a) In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against a
professional licensed by the State of Georgia... or against any licensed
health care facility alleged to be liable based upon the action or inaction
of a health care professional licensed by the State of Georgia . . . the
plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an
expert competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at
least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis
for each such claim.
'o See Baird v. Celis, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (holding that Georgia's
expert affidavit requirement did not apply in federal diversity actions); Boone v. Knight, 131
F.R.D. 609, 612 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (holding same). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit passed on the opportunity to rule on whether Georgia's heightened pleading statute
applies in federal diversity actions by finding that regardless of whether the statue applied
in federal court, the district court had erred in failing to provide the plaintiff leave to amend
the complaint in order to produce the requisite affidavit. Brown v. Nichols, 8 F.3d 770, 774
(11th Cir. 1993). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit declined to determine whether the Georgia
statute applies in federal court. Id.
"07 Boone, 131 F.R.D. at 610-12.
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essentially apleading requirement."' Therefore, by"requiring that
the plaintiff attach to his complaint the affidavit of an expert
witness, the statute in effect mandates the pleading of evidentiary
material."' 9 The Boone court further concluded that Rule 8 governs
pleading in federal courts and that evidentiary pleadings run afoul
of the notice pleading standard set forth in Rule 8.11 Following the
"teaching of Hanna," which requires the Federal Rules to control in
situations of conflict with state rules, the Boone court held that
when a specific Federal Rule governs "the form of pleading in
federal court, that rule controls over any contrary provisions of state
law.""'
Nine years later, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia revisited the issue of whether Georgia's statute should
apply in federal court."2 In Baird v. Celis, the court considered
whether, in absence of the state statute, Rule 8 would govern the
pleading requirements for medical malpractice actions. 1 3 Once
again, direction provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hanna was
relied upon to determine that Georgia's heightened pleading statute
was a procedural rule rather than a substantive rule." 4 The Baird
court reasoned that in Hanna, Rule 4 would have controlled the
plaintiffs service of process requirements if the state statute was
not in existence." 5 Therefore, the Baird court relied on Hanna's
instruction that:
[w]hen a situation is covered by one of the Federal
Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the
typical, relatively unguided Erie choice: the court has
been instructed to apply the Federal Rule and can refuse
to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and
Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the
108 Id. at 611.
109 Id.
110 Id.
11 Id.
112 Baird v. Celis, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
113 Id. at 1360.
... See id. at 1360-61 (noting that similar to rule at issue in Hanna, Georgia's statute sets
forth stricter pleading standards).
15 Id. at 1360.
20051 993
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the
Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.
116
Thus, the Baird court found that because Georgia's statute was in
direct conflict with the notice pleading standards prescribed in Rule
8, the court was "bound by Hanna to adhere to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure governing Plaintiffs pleading obligations."117
Similarly, in 1995 the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Florida recognized that Florida's heightened pleading statute,
which also requires an expert affidavit to be filed simultaneously
with a medical malpractice complaint,"' directly conflicts with Rule
8.11 The Braddock court relied in part on an Eleventh Circuit
decision that overruled a district court's decision to require plaintiffs
to plead their defamation claim with particularity under a Florida
state law. 2 ° In considering the defamation pleading requirements,
the Eleventh Circuit had held that "[wihile Florida requires,
perhaps wisely, specific allegations of publication in the complaint,
under Hanna a federal court need not adhere to a state's strict
pleading requirements but should instead follow [Rule 8] .,,121 Thus,
the Braddock court reasoned that the heightened pleading require-
ments set forth for medical malpractice actions should be treated
similarly, thereby requiring that the Federal Rules governing
procedure apply in federal court.'22
On the other hand, federal courts sitting in diversity in other
states have chosen to apply heightened pleading statutes, often by
claiming an alleged absence of a direct collision between Rule 8 and
the particular state statute. For example, in 1997 the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey held that New Jersey's state
statute, which requires plaintiffs to provide an expert affidavit
within sixty days of filing a medical malpractice action,'23 should be
116 Id. (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)).
117 Id. at 1362.
118 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.203(2) (West 1997).
11' Braddock v. Orlando Reg'l Health Care Sys., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 580, 584 (M.D. Fla.
1995).
120 Id. (discussing Caster v. Hennessey, 781 F.2d 1569 (11th Cir. 1986)).
12' Caster, 781 F.2d at 1570 (citations omitted).
12 Braddock, 881 F. Supp. at 584.
1'3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000) reads:
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applied by a federal court sitting in diversity.'24 The RTC court
began by admitting that the determination of whether a situation
is covered by state law or a Federal Rule is not always "straightfor-
ward."'25 In considering Rules 8 and 9, the RTC court cited
Leatherman v. Tarrant City Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit 2 ' and Conley v. Gibson,'27 two of the Supreme Court's seminal
decisions regarding the function and intent of Rule 8, as espousing
the notion that the pleading structure of the Federal Rules "leaves
further procedures, specifically, discovery and motions to dismiss or
for summary judgment, to perform other functions that historically
had been performed by pleadings." 2 ' The RTC court failed,
however, to actually apply the Supreme Court's directive to rely on
these other Federal Rules to flesh out the merits and facts behind
a pleading, instead applying New Jersey's affidavit requirement in
hopes of eliminating unmeritorious claims.'29
The RTC court also acknowledged the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia's decision in Boone, which held that a
Georgia statute "somewhat similar" to New Jersey's statute
conflicted with Rule 8.130 Nevertheless, the RTC court proceeded to
outline each difference between the New Jersey and Georgia
statutes.131 The court particularly relied upon the variation in
timing, noting that New Jersey's requirement that the plaintiff
submit an affidavit within sixty days after the defendant's answer
In any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or
property damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negli-
gence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff
shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the answer to the
complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of
an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability
that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment,
practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside accept-
able professional or occupational standards or treatment practices ....
124 RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 981 F. Supp. 334,347 (D.N.J.
1997).
125 Id. at 342.
126 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993).
127 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
128 RTC, 981 F. Supp. at 342-43.
129 Id. at 345.
130 Id. at 343.
131 Id. at 343-44.
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strongly suggests that the requirement is completely separate from
pleading." 2 The RTC court ultimately found that the affidavit of
merit requirement could not be characterized as a pleading because
it was "functionally unrelated, physically separated, and temporally
disconnected from the pleading stage of a case."'33 In doing so, the
RTC court utilized a technical variation in the timing of filing to
circumvent Rule 8's notice pleading requirements. Thus, the New
Jersey federal district court was able to determine that the statute
did not conflict with Rules 8 and 9."' Because of the alleged
absence of a direct conflict between the affidavit of merit statute and
any of the Federal Rules, the court continued its Erie analysis,
ultimately concluding that the New Jersey statute was outcome-
determinative, that no overriding federal interest required applica-
tion of federal law, and that the state statute should therefore apply
in federal court.3 5
Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
also considered whether New Jersey's affidavit of merit statute
should be applied in federal court diversity actions.3 6 The Cham-
berlain court held that "[tihe required affidavit is not a pleading, is
not filed until after the pleadings are closed, and does not contain a
statement of the factual basis of the claim."' 37 The Third Circuit
came to this conclusion despite the provision in the New Jersey
statute stating that failure to file the affidavit of merit is deemed as
"'failure to state a cause of action,' " thus implying that failure to
comply with the statute is a direct violation of a pleading require-
ment.' Instead, the Chamberlain court considered the purpose of
the affidavit requirement as assuring that "malpractice claims for
which there is no expert support will be terminated at an early
132 Id. at 343.
133 Id. at 345.
134 Id.
13. Id. at 346-47.
131 Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 157 (3d Cir. 2000).
137 Id. at 160.
138 Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-29 (West 2000)). The Third Circuit read "the
'deeming' language to be no more than the New Jersey legislature's way of saying that the
consequences of a failure to file shall be the same as those of a failure to state a claim." Id.
(emphasis added).
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stage in the proceedings."' z The Third Circuit failed to consider,
however, the Supreme Court's pronouncements that the Federal
Rules rely upon liberal discovery methods and summary judgment
to eliminate unmeritorious claims.140 The Third Circuit also failed
to consider that Rule 26 already controls the mandatory disclosures
during the initial phases of discovery.' The court ignored the fact
that the Federal Rules are already replete with tools that judges
and litigants should use to eradicate frivolous lawsuits without
having to resort to state heightened pleading statutes. Instead, the
Third Circuit affirmed the decision to apply the New Jersey affidavit
of merit statute, justifying its decision by claiming that the statute's
application would not compromise the pleading system designed by
the Federal Rules. 42
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
deemed Colorado's certificate of review statute applicable to federal
court diversity proceedings. 43  Colorado's statute essentially
requires the plaintiffs attorney to certify within sixty days of filing
a complaint that an expert has reviewed the medical malpractice
claims and has found them to contain" 'substantial justification.'"'1
In determining whether the state statute should apply in federal
diversity actions, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the
certificate of review statute was in direct conflict with Rule 11,145
which requires attorneys to certify that papers submitted to the
court are not given for "any improper purpose" and that the
allegations "have evidentiary support" or will likely have such
139 Id.
140 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (noting that Rule 8's
standard of notice pleading relies on "liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions
to weed out frivolous claims"); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) (stating that
simplified pleading standards embodied in Rule 8 are made possible by other procedures set
forth in Federal Rules, including "liberal opportunity for discovery and.., other pretrial
procedures").
141 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (setting forth requirements for disclosure of certain
information, including expert testimony, initially and prior to trial).
142 Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 161. In 2001, the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey relied upon the Chamberlain court's decision in applying New Jersey's affidavit of
merit statute in federal court. Kindig v. Gooberman, 149 F. Supp. 2d 159, 163 (D.N.J. 2001).
1 Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1541 (1996).
144 Id. at 1537-38 (quoting CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (2002)).
'5 Id. at 1540.
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support after further discovery. 4 ' Although the Tenth Circuit noted
that both the Colorado statute and Rule 11 intend to "weed unjusti-
fiable claims out of the system," the court concluded that the two
rules do not collide and can peacefully coexist.147 The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that because the certificate of review statute covered a
special class of defendants and expedited the litigation process by
imposing a sixty-day time limit, the Colorado statute covered
substantive interests not addressed by Rule 11.148 Like the Third
Circuit would do four years later, the Tenth Circuit failed to even
mention the Supreme Court's jurisprudence handed down in Conley
and Leatherman. Both cases specifically articulate that the Federal
Rules are already equipped to guard against frivolous claims in a
timely manner through application of liberal discovery rules,
including mandatory initial disclosures, and through summary
judgment and motions to dismiss. 14' Furthermore, while the Tenth
Circuit noted its reluctance to impinge upon federal pleading
requirements, the court justified its decision to require an additional
filing of a certificate of merit in federal court by rationalizing that
"one additional filing with the court [ I is relatively minor."5 ' But
the idea that a "relatively minor" alteration of the federal pleading
requirements is ever permissible directly contravenes the Supreme
Court's repeated pronouncement that notice pleading should not be
disturbed, as embodied in the trilogy of Conley, Leatherman, and
Swierkiewicz.15
Thus, federal courts have continually varied when determining
whether to apply state heightened pleading statutes. 52  The
common denominator among the courts deeming such statutes
applicable in federal court is a failure to consider Supreme Court
146 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
147 Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1540.
148 Id.
149 See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
150 Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1540 (emphasis added).
'51 See infra notes 208-28 and accompanying text.
152 For a discussion of how the federal courts of a single state have inconsistently applied
a state certificate of merit statute in federal court, see Robert P. Vogt, Must Med-Mal
Plaintiffs File Section 2-622 Certificates of Merit in Federal Court?, 91 ILL. B.J. 72, 72-74
(2003).
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guidance by refusing to uphold the sanctity of the Federal Rules,
particularly Rule 8.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT SOLUTION-HISTORY,
PRECEDENT, AND THE FEDERAL RULES
Heightened pleading requirements in medical malpractice actions
should not govern in federal court. The reasons are simple: history,
precedent, and the Federal Rules. History does not support any
claim that heightened pleading should be used to filter out expen-
sive and time consuming claims.'53 Rather, history emphasizes a
gradual shift toward notice pleading to ensure that litigants are not
procedurally precluded from receiving their day in court.
154
Likewise, precedent has uniformly condemned attempts to circum-
vent the notice pleading requirements successfully utilized in
federal courts since 1938.155 In 1957, 1993, and 2002, the Supreme
Court evaluated the issue of heightened pleadings and, in each
instance, rebuffed attempts to incorporate any heightened pleading
requirement into Rule 8.156 Finally, the letter and the spirit of the
Federal Rules reserve only two categories of claims that merit
heightened pleading: fraud and mistake.'57 Because the current
medical malpractice crisis does not present any compelling reason
to discard history, precedent, or the Federal Rules, the state
153 See Roscoe Pound, Some Principles ofProcedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 388,403 (1910)
(noting that "principle [was] submitted and... discussed at length in the report of the special
committee of the American Bar Association to suggest remedies and formulate proposed laws
to prevent delay and unnecessary cost in litigation"). Pound further observed that
"[elxperience has shown abundantly that a huge mass of detail, such as the present New York
Code of Civil Procedure, is a mistake." Id.
'5 See infra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
1 The paradigmatic example of notice pleading remains Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d
774 (2d Cir. 1944). Students of Civil Procedure should be familiar with this case as Dioguardi
is included in nearly every major Civil Procedure textbook. Interestingly, the author of
Dioguardi was none other than Judge Clark himself, the principal architect of the Federal
Rules' simple pleading design. Thus, it is not surprising that the Dioguardi decision takes
a very liberal view toward notice pleading. It is important to note, however, that Dioguardi
is cited with approval in footnote five of Conley v. Gibson. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46
n.5 (1957).
156 See infra notes 208-28 and accompanying text.
57 FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b).
999
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
solution of heightened pleading is unacceptable in the federal
system.
A. THE BIRTH OF NOTICE PLEADING-THE ROLE OF HISTORY
Scholars and litigators have constantly challenged the formalities
of pleading and procedure. In 1909, Roscoe Pound inquired whether
it was possible to "make the rules of procedure, rules to help
litigants, rules to assist them in getting through the courts" more
user-friendly."5 8 The solution, Pound proposed, was to "mak[e] it
unprofitable to raise questions of procedure for any purpose except
to develop the merits of the cause to the full."'59 But early forms of
pleading capitalized on formalities and often discarded cases on
procedural shortcomings rather than on merit-based determina-
tions.160
The earliest pleadings were presented orally and permitted an
informal process of exchange with the court. 6' This informality
empowered courts to correct the missteps of counsel and ensure that
the applicable law was considered in any given case. With the rise
of the jury in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, pleadings shifted
from oral to written presentations. 62  The advent of written
pleadings placed new emphasis on the form of the claims and the
packaging or presentation of the lawsuit.
The first major pleading system was the English common-law
system. 6 ' Under the common law, litigants were forced to choose
from one of eleven discrete forms of action: trespass; trespass on the
15 Pound, supra note 153, at 400.
159 Id.
60 Charles E. Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 1 F.R.D. 417,420 (1940)
(criticizing that "under the ancient common law, one really had no substantive right unless
he could find a procedural form of action wherein to enforce it"), reprinted in 24 J. AM.
JUDICATURE Socy 158, 160 (1941).
161 CHARLES E. CLARK, CASES ON MODERN PLEADING 18 (3d ed. 1952) [hereinafter CLARK,
MODERN PLEADING] ("When the pleadings were oral, a considerable degree of informality in
discussion and colloquy with the court appears to have been stimulated.").
162 Id.
'63 For an exceptional treatment of historical pleading systems spanning the Norman
conquest in 1066 to the Curia Regis, or King's Court, which evolved into the common-law
system, see ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS
523-34 (2003).
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case; debt; detinue; replevin; trover; ejectment; covenant; account;
special assumpsit; and general assumpsit."' These finite forms of
action provided the sole options for litigants. Unless a case fit
neatly into one of the eleven established categories, no legal relief
was possible.1 5 Further, in presenting the form of action, litigants
were forced to choose between courts of law and courts of equity.
66
Common-law pleading did not permit claims to simultaneously seek
relief under law and in the courts of equity.
67
The final distinction between common-law pleading and modern
pleading stems from the purpose of pleadings. 6 Out of concern that
lay juries could not fully appreciate complicated issues, the goal of
common-law pleading was to have the adversaries plead back and
forth in response until, finally, a single issue was isolated for trial.1
9
Thus, earlyjuries were never presented with a multi-issue case, and
any misstep by counsel along the way could prove fatal to a client's
success.
Common-law pleading, with its formal, unyielding writs and its
insistence on narrowing every controversy to a single issue,
eventually gave way to the system referred to as code pleading.
17
Although most scholars credit Professor David Dudley Field with
164 Id. at 526-29.
65 Id. at 526.
'6 Id. at 533-34.
167 Id.
'" Id. at 529-32 (discussing pleading ritual ofplaintiff initiating action by filing his or her
declaration, followed by defendant's demurrer or plea, followed by plaintiffs demurrer or
replication, followed by defendant's rejoinder and rebutter and, finally, close of pleadings with
plaintiffs surrejoinder and rebutter).
169 Judge Clark described the evolution as follows:
Since the facts were passed upon by a body of laymen, not by a trained
judge, it was felt necessary to ascertain clearly the points of dispute
between the parties before the trial was begun. The institution of trial by
jury, which meant so much to our ancestors in their efforts to secure a free
and impartial justice, is therefore responsible for this striking characteris-
tic of common-law pleading-the development of an issue.
CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 13 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter
CLARK, CODE PLEADING].
170 See Charles E. Clark, Trial of Actions Under the Code, 11 CORNELL L.Q. 482, 482-83
(1926) (explaining that "[tihe long-protracted struggle against this system resulted in the
legislative decree abolishing these forms and substituting therefor an entirely different
pleading objective, the pleading of the facts only, that is, the respective stories of the parties
litigant").
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crafting the modern code system in 1848, Judge Clark suggested
that much of the "Field Code" emanated from Edward Livingston's
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure in 1805.17' Regardless of its
genesis, the New York Field Code bequeathed three vital contribu-
tions to procedural law, all of which would be replicated in some
form under the Federal Rules: (1) the merger of courts of law and
equity; (2) the creation of a single cause of action, the civil action;
and (3) the simplification of pleading. 172
Under the Field Code, pleaders were expected to assert "[a] plain
and concise statement of the facts constituting each cause of action
without unnecessary repetition."' 7' This form of pleading, now
known as fact pleading, placed an emphasis on the material facts in
dispute. However, much confusion and an equal amount of
controversy erupted over whether facts were considered "material,"
"ultimate," "evidentiary," or simply conclusions of law. 174  Much
litigation was generated on matters of pleading procedure, which
unintentionally resurrected the common-law emphasis on form over
substance.7 v In evaluating the historical systems of pleading, Judge
Clark reflected that "the lawsuit is to vindicate rules of substantive
law, not rules of pleading, and the latter must always yield to the
171 Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 305 (1938)
[hereinafter Clark, Handmaid of Justice].
172 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 169, at 81 (describing New York statute that
abolished distinction between law and equity). In interpreting the New York statute, Judge
Clark admonished that "tilt should be noticed that the distinction between the actions
themselves and also between their forms is to be abolished. Distinctions of form and of
substance are to be done away with." Id.
'73 Id. at 210. A cursory review of code pleading under the Field Code reveals that, much
like the modern Federal Rules, there were three simple components to code pleading:
"(1) pleading the title of the action, including the names of plaintiffs and defendants;
(2) pleading 'a plain and concise statement of facts constituting each cause of action without
unnecessary repetition;' and, (3) a demand for judgment." Id. In contrast, the Federal Rules
require that pleaders set forth a short and plain statement regarding the court's jurisdiction
and the claim entitling the pleaders to relief, as well as a demand for judgment. FED. R. Civ.
P. 8(a). The Field Code requirement for a caption, or title, is covered under the Federal Rules
by Rule 10, "Form of Pleadings, Caption; Names of Parties." Id. 10(a).
174 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 169, at 225-30 (discussing sufficiency of notice
issues that arise with fact pleading). The objective of pleading material facts yielded many
cases on pleading. As Judge Clark noted, "[the codifiers'] ideal of pleading facts, as it has
been worked out, has proved probably the most unsatisfactory part of their reform." Id. at
226.
175 Id. at 228.
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former."" 6 Thus, within the next hundred years, code pleading and
its unforeseen formalism was abandoned for a more straightforward
process.
177
B. NOTICE PLEADING AS A CORNERSTONE IN THE FEDERAL RULES
Simplified notice pleading remains the cornerstone of the Federal
Rules .171 "It is in effect a de-emphasis upon pleading as a control-
ling element in decision and a subordination of procedure to its
proper position as an aid to the understanding of a case, rather than
a series of restrictions on the parties or the court."7 9 To fully
appreciate the importance of simplified pleading as the quintessence
of the Federal Rules, one must have a modicum of understanding of
the two antiquated American pleading systems. For without an
understanding of the impetus for procedural reform and the
historical disdain for form over substance, i80 critics will remain able
to erroneously suggest that certain "big cases" merit some form of
heightened pleading.
The adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938 was a major legislative
accomplishment.' The Federal Rules achieved two main objec-
tives: (1) They provided simplified rules for pleading, and (2) they
merged law and equity before a single court.'82 U.S. Attorney
176 Id. at 60.
177 See Pound, supra note 153, at 403 (remarkingthat"[e]xperience has shown abundantly
that a huge mass of details, such as the present New York Code of Civil Procedure, is a
mistake... [blut it proceeded upon a wrong principle"). The "wrong principle" included the
shortcoming that the Field Code eventually swelled to over 3,000 sections. Id. In contrast,
the English Judicature Act codified a mere 100 sections and appended 58. Id.
178 Charles E. Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1948, at 144, 154 [hereinafter Clark, Federal Procedural Reform] ("The
cornerstone of the new reform is a system of simple, direct, and unprolonged allegations of
claims and defenses by the litigants ... ."); see also Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened
Pleading, 81 TEx. L. REV. 551, 551 (2002) (stating that Rule 8 "is the keystone of the system
of procedure embodied in the Federal Rules"); Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty,
76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1917-18 (1998) (referring to Rule 8 as "a jewel in the crown of the
Federal Rules").
179 Clark, Federal Procedure Reform, supra note 178, at 154.
"s See Fairman, supra note 178, at 554 (observing that Rule 8 "with its splendid
simplicity, stands as the centerpiece of a procedural system designed to rectify the pleading
abuses of the past").
l~' Clark, Handmaid of Justice, supra note 171, at 298.
182 See Clark, Federal Procedural Reform, supra note 178, at 154-55 (observing that
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General Homer S. Cummings worked diligently to secure federal
legislation that ultimately empowered the U.S. Supreme Court to
promulgate the rules of procedure for civil actions in federal court. 8 3
Previously, federal courts were bound by the Conformity Act of
1873,84 which required federal courts to apply procedural rules" 'as
near as may be' to the local practice of the state wherein the federal
court was sitting.""5 For example, the Conformity Act required a
Texas federal court to apply the procedural requirements mandated
in Texas state courts, while a California federal court would abide
by procedures applied in California state courts.186 This system was
quickly perceived as "highly unsatisfactory."" 7 As certain scholars
noted:
The purpose of the [Conformity] Act was to provide a
uniform procedure for all courts in the same state, but
exceptions to its application caused adherence to state
practice by the federal courts to be erratic. In addition,
the effect of the Act was to abdicate responsibility for
formulating rules of procedure for the federal courts to
state legislatures, instead of giving that responsibility to
"[w]ith the de-emphasizing of particularized pleading there remained no reason why all
claims between litigants could not be desirably adjusted at one time").
"l Honorable Oscar R. Luhring, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Civil
Procedure for the District of Columbia, Lecture at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C. 5
(Nov. 17, 1938) (transcript on file with author).
184 Conformity Act, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872) (repealed 1934). See also CLARK,
MODERN PLEADING, supra note 161, at 15 (explaining that "Conformity Act . ..was
superseded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted by the Supreme Court of the
United States under statutory authority effective September 16, 1938, and providing for a
uniform system of pleading and practice throughout the federal system of courts").
1 Clark, Federal Procedural Reform, supra note 178, at 146.
8 The Supreme Court observed that:
Under the Conformity Act, "The practice, pleadings, and forms and
modes of proceeding in civil causes, other than equity and admiralty
causes, in the district courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the
practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the
time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such
district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding."
How a suit shall be begun, whether by writ or by informal notice, is a
question of the practice of the state or of its forms and modes of proceed-
ing.
Chisholm v. Gilmer, 299 U.S. 99, 102 (1936) (internal citations omitted).
187 Clark, Federal Procedural Reform, supra note 178, at 146.
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the federal courts, which are more qualified to under-
take this task.'88
Thus, with the formation of the American Bar Association in
1878, procedural reform became an immediate priority.'89 As early
as 1912, the American Bar Association pushed for procedural reform
to no avail. 90 Once Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act in
1934, the long awaited relief finally seemed forthcoming.' 9' With
the combined efforts of Attorney General Cummings and the
Advisory Committee appointed to draft the new rules, federal
litigators received a truly uniform set of rules to apply in federal
civil cases.'92 With their efforts, notice pleading was born.
One of the main driving forces behind procedural reform was the
growing disdain for formalistic code pleading.'93 The aim of the new
Federal Rules was to provide a pleading system based on simplicity
'8 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.4, at 210 (3d ed. 1999) (citations
omitted).
"s Clark, Federal Procedural Reform, supra note 178, at 146-47.
'9 See Clark, Handmaid ofJustice, supra note 171, at 307-08 (recounting collective efforts
needed to effect procedural reform).
191 The Rules Enabling Act is currently codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 and provides
that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including
proceedings before magistrate Judges thereof) and courts of appeals." 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)
(2000).
192 For a brief history of Cummings' role in securing the passage of the 1934 Act, which
enabled the Federal Rules to be passed, see Clark, Federal Procedural Reform, supra note
178, at 147-48. Judge Clark remarked that Cummings had "[w]ithin the short space of ninety
days . . . practically singlehanded [sic], secured the adoption of the measure, on June 19,
1934." Id. at 148.
1' Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOWA L. REv. 272, 277 (1942) [hereinafter
Clark, Simplified Pleading]. Judge Clark admonished as follows:
Therefore, it may be concluded that this tendency to seek admissions
by detailed pleadings is at best wasteful, inefficient, and time-consuming,
at most productive of confusion as to the real merits of the cause and even
of actual denial ofjustice. The continuous experience from common-law
pleading down through the reversions to pleading formalities recurring
under code pleading indicates the necessity of having clearly in mind the
limited, but important, purposes of pleading and how they cannot be
pressed wisely beyond such purposes. It demonstrates, in the writer's
judgment, the necessity of procedural rules which enforce the mandate of
simplicity and directness and which are made real and compelling by
illustrative forms showing what this simplicity means in actual experi-
ence.
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and uniformity.'94 Generations past had suffered years of common-
law pleading only to find this perilous system replaced by the
equally problematic system of code or fact-based pleading. 9 ' The
one consistency in both the common-law and code pleading systems
was that litigants often missed their opportunity to argue the merits
of their claims due to procedural defects in their pleadings.'96 Thus,
the new Federal Rules sought to overcome this limitation of form
over substance and ensure that cases were decided on the merits.197
Rule 8 epitomizes the simplicity of the Federal Rules by requiring
that a complaint contain only "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."19 There are no
magic words, no requirement that a case fit any particular model or
design, and no mandate for specificity of facts, claims, or evidence.
Rather, the Federal Rules only require that a complaint provide
ample notice to the defendant, enabling the defendant to answer.'99
Rule 84 explicitly refers litigants to the Appendix of Forms attached
to the Federal Rules for guidance illustrating "the simplicity and
'94 See id. at 272 (observing that (s]implified pleading is basic to any program of civil
procedural reform"); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 1 (stating unequivocally that Federal Rules "shall
be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action").
19' Judge Clark explained the difference between the two as follows:
For the present we may attempt to state the main purpose of pleading
as we now conceive of it. If the common law may be termed issue
pleading, since its main purpose was the framing of an issue, code
pleading may be referred to as fact pleading, in view of the great emphasis
placed under the codes upon getting the facts stated. More recently there
has been advocated what is called notice pleading. This is in general a
very brief statement, designed merely to give notice of the claim to the
opponent.
CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 169, at 56 (emphasis in original).
196 Fairman, supra note 178, at 555-56.
197 See id. at 557 ("The notice function of pleading, however, cannot be divorced from the
global vision of the drafters: litigants should have their day in court. Consequently, the
Rules were designed to encourage determination on the merits." (emphasis in original)).
'98 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
19 Fairman, supra note 178, at 561-62. Fairman notes that:
Indeed, the pleading need only give the opposing party fair notice of the
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the
type of litigation involved. As long as the opposing party and the court
can have a basic understanding of the claim being made, the requirements
are satisfied.
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brevity of statement which the rules contemplate." °° Rule 8
provides further protection against formalistic pitfalls by specifying
that "[nio technical forms of pleading or motions are required." 0 1
Finally, Rule 8 ensures that "[a] 11 pleadings shall be so construed asto do. .. ..202
to do substantial justice. With two simple rules, Rules 8 and 84,
the drafters of the Federal Rules eliminated the main quagmire
delimiting common-law and code pleading.2 3 As Judge Clark noted,
"These minimal requirements.., emphasize only the setting forth
of the factual situation as a whole; they do not compel the alleging
of fine details, or the inclusion of a series of legal epithets or
conclusions as to the defendant's conduct."
20 4
This minimalist pleading approach has existed since the Federal
Rules became effective on September 16, 1938.205 And yet, as
200 FED. R. Civ. P. 84.
201 Id. 8(e)(1).
202 Id. 8(f).
203 Luhring, supra note 183, at 8. Judge Luhring eloquently illustrated this point:
One of the major difficulties that we encountered under the old system
were these successive dilatory pleadings. These pleadings were presented
before pleading to the merits. For example, there were pleas to the
jurisdiction or venue, pleas in abatement on account of the disability of
the plaintiffor defendant, and for defect of parties or for pendency [sic] of
another action. File one and that is overruled; file another and that, too,
is overruled and so on, each postponing the day of judgment and all
making for delay.
These new rules put a stop to that sort of practice.
Id. Judge Clark noted the dichotomy between the advantageous nature of common-law
pleading and the pitfalls of specialized pleading as follows:
Indeed, it is interesting to see how the true common-law pleading had at
one and the same time a simple system of direct allegation which is the
basis of the federal forms today in negligence and contract actions, and
also that system of specialized allegation which was the glory of techni-
cian and the shame of the lover of justice .... Many of these written
pleadings did become highly formalized, as counsel realized the possibili-
ties of extensive allegation followed by affirmation and denial, together
with confession and avoidance, replication, rebutter, and surrebutter, as
long as anything stood not completely denied. The system lent itself to
prolonged paper disputations, of which advantage was taken by lawyers
naturally anxious to obtain admissions from their opponents without
committing themselves. This was the side of common-law pleading which
brought it into disrepute.
Clark, Simplified Pleading, supra note 193, at 275.
204 Clark, Simplified Pleading, supra note 193, at 273.
2m See Clark, Federal Procedural Reform, supra note 178, at 150 (discussing history of
drafting Federal Rules from committee activity to presentation to Court approval). The
Federal Rules were presented to the Seventy-fifth session of Congress by Attorney General
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recently illustrated by federal courts in the Third Circuit," 6 many
litigants and judges have sought to disturb the basic pleading
system by insisting that certain "big cases" require something more
than a short and plain statement of the claim. 0 7 Fortunately, the
Supreme Court has continually rebuffed these efforts. Thus, it is
surprising that once again a group is clamoring for their "big case"
to receive special treatment.
C. THE FIRM FOUNDATION OF NOTICE PLEADING IN PRECEDENT
The Supreme Court has never required anything more than
notice pleading in any case falling within the ambit of Rule 8.208 In
a trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court has demonstrated unyielding
fidelity to Judge Clark's desire for simplicity in pleading." 9
Beginning with the seminal case of Conley v. Gibson in 1957, the
Supreme Court has continually and consistently interpreted Rule 8
to require simplified notice pleading.210 As the Court noted, "[siuch
simplified 'notice pleading' is made possible by the liberal opportu-
nity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by
the [Federal] Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim
and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and
Cummings. Id. Congress levied no objections, and the Federal Rules became effective on
September 16, 1938. Id.
20 See supra notes 123-42 and accompanying text.
'o Professor Miller's article begins with a challenge to the litigation crisis reforms:
The loudly trumpeted (but as yet unproven) "litigation explosion" and
its metaphorical twin, the "liability crisis," have energized court "reform"
efforts in recent years on both the local and national levels. Critics
maintain that excessive and frivolous litigation overwhelms the judicial
system's capacity to administer speedy and efficient justice, leads to
higher costs for litigants and society at large, and even hinders America's
competitive position in the global economy.
Miller, supra note 28, at 984.
2w But see FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring heightened pleading in cases claiming fraud or
mistake). Fraud and mistake are the only two exceptions to notice pleading enshrined in the
Federal Rules. Id.
'2 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (alleging employment
discrimination under Title VII); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (alleging civil rights claim against municipality);
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (alleging race discrimination under Railway Labor
Act).
210 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48.
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issues."21' The purpose of notice pleading is not to set forth evidence
in an attempt to sift merit-based claims from frivolous lawsuits.
Rather, the purpose of pleading under the Federal Rules is simply
to notify the parties and the court of the basics of the dispute.212
Unlike previous pleading systems, the Federal Rules do not
envision pleadings as a means to an end in themselves. Pleadings
in federal court provide a mere outline of the pending controversy." 3
Conley underscores this point in a still oft-quoted passage: "The
Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in
which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and
accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a
proper decision on the merits.""4
Despite the clarity of Conley, federal courts have often required
heightened pleading in various civil actions ranging from antitrust
to civil rights to defamation to employment discrimination to
RICO.215 These requirements are not consistent with either the
letter or spirit of Rule 8 and have, accordingly, been disavowed by
the Supreme Court when faced with heightened pleading requests.
Despite the Supreme Court's demonstrated allegiance toward notice
pleading under Rule 8, there have been repeated attempts to
circumvent the amendment process of the Federal Rules by trying
211 Id.
212 Fairman, supra note 178, at 561-62.
213 Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading and the Demurrer, 26 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOCY
81, 81 (1942). Judge Clark considered the purpose of pleadings to be:
The usual modern expression, at least of text writers, is to refer to the
notice function of pleadings; notice of the case to the parties, the court,
and the persons interested. This is a sound approach so far as it goes; but
content must still be given to the word "notice." It cannot be defined so
literally as to mean all the details of the parties' claims, or else the rule
is no advance. The notice in mind is rather that of the general nature of
the case and the circumstances or events upon which it is based, so as to
differentiate it from other acts or events, to inform the opponent of the
affair or transaction to be litigated-but not of details which he should
ascertain for himself in preparing his defense-and to tell the court of the
broad outlines of the case.
ld.
214 Conley, 355 U.S. at 48.
215 For an extraordinary treatment of heightened pleading for specific categories of cases,
see Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 987, 1011-59
(2003) (detailing pleading practice in antitrust, CERCLA, civil rights, conspiracy, copyright,
defamation, negligence, and RICO cases).
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to justify heightened pleading in special "big cases."216 The defining
feature of these "big cases" appears to be the potential expense and
disruption that a lawsuit might cause the defendant. But these
justifications have not yet convinced the Court to vary from its firm
support of notice pleading.
In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, the Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed its
holding in Conley when confronted with the issue of whether federal
courts may apply heightened pleading to civil rights cases alleging
municipal liability. 17 The respondents, seeking to impose height-
ened pleading requirements against civil rights plaintiffs, reasoned
that "a more relaxed pleading requirement would subject municipal-
ities to expensive and time-consuming discovery in every § 1983
case, eviscerating their immunity from suit and disrupting munici-
pal functions."21 In other words, the respondents asserted that
without heightened pleading rules, cities might be prone to frivolous
lawsuits that would be costly.1
The Supreme Court was unaffected by this argument. Staying
true to Rule 8's mandate for a short and plain statement, the
Supreme Court explained that the only permissible method for
demanding heightened pleading was the Federal Rules' amendment
process. 20 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained:
Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims
against municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected
to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But
that is a result which must be obtained by the process of
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial inter-
pretation. In the absence of such an amendment, federal
courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment
210 See, e.g., Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 396 F.3d 508, 511 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasizing
that deceptive trade practices claims asserted in McDonald's obesity litigation "need only
meet the bare-bones notice-pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)").
217 507 U.S. 163, 164-68 (1993).
218 Id. at 166.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 168.
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and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious
claims sooner rather than later.22'
Less than ten years later in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., the
Supreme Court took the opportunity to revisit the issue of height-
ened pleading in another distinct category of cases-employment
discrimination.222 Once again, in a unanimous opinion, the Court
reiterated that [t]he liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the
starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted
to focus litigation on the merits of a claim."22 ' The respondent,
despite the petitioner's nine page complaint,224 challenged the
sufficiency of the petitioner's allegations because the respondent
feared that "allowing lawsuits based on conclusory allegations of
discrimination to go forward will burden the courts and encourage
disgruntled employees to bring unsubstantiated suits."
225
The Court did not permit fears concerning frivolous lawsuits and
litigation expenses to transmogrify the pleading requirements in
federal court. Rather, the Court emphasized the Federal Rules'
reliance on liberal discovery and summary judgment proceedings to
ferret out meritless claims.226 Returning to the point made a decade
earlier in Leatherman, the Court noted that the only manner in
which heightened pleading should be invoked is through the
amendment process to the Federal Rules.227 Rule 8(a) addresses
civil actions generally and does not vary or waiver depending on the
subjective belief of certain defendants who categorically assert the
claims against them are without merit.22
21 Id. at 168-69.
222 534 U.S. 506, 506 (2002).
Id. at 514.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17 (Jan. 15, 2002), Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506 (2002), 2002 WL 54497.
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514.
Id. at 512 ('This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules
and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of
unmeritorious claims.").
227 Id. at 515 (noting that "[a] requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is
a result that 'must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by
judicial interpretation' " (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993))).
=' Id.
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It was once thought that Leatherman would put to rest any
residual hope that certain categories of claims could be subjected to
heightened pleading requirements by judicial fiat.22 1 Judges and
litigants, however, persisted in making the charge that certain cases
should require something more than Rule 8's plain and simple
statement.3 ° And, so, the Supreme Court was required to revisit
the issue and has again admonished that notice pleading constitutes
a simplified version of pleading.2"' The only two exceptions to notice
pleading remain encompassed in Rule 9(b): cases alleging fraud and
mistake." 2 The short and plain statement requirement remains the
standard in federal court, and the Supreme Court has shown no
willingness to make any exceptions for the "big case."
D. THE MERITS-BASED DESIGN OF THE FEDERAL RULES
Heightened pleading is antithetical to the design of the Federal
Rules. 3 Rather, the Federal Rules were intended to provide a more
expedient and simplified route to merits-based decisions." 4 The
overall structure of the Federal Rules empowers judges to discard
frivolous lawsuits through pretrial control and pretrial
procedures.235 Provided that judges properly apply the provisions
229 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1230 (3d ed. 2004); Fairman, supra note 178, at 572.
"' E.g., Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 396 F.3d 508, 512 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005) (vacating
district court's dismissal of claim for vagueness and noting that cure for deficiency of claim
that is not required to be pleaded with particularity is motion for more definite statement
under Rule 12(e)).
231 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
232 FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b).
" See Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules in State Practice, 23 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 520,
524 (1950-51) [hereinafter Clark, Federal Rules in State Practice] (reminding that "[iln
drafting the original rules, the Advisory Committee did have in mind the inconvenience for
many of continued attendance upon the court and did all it could to discourage preliminary
formal attacks involving mere shadow-boxing of counsel, not reaching the merits of litigated
matters").
'z See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (reminding that "[the liberal notice pleading of Rule
8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation
on the merits of a claim").
's Charles E. Clark, "Clarifying"Amendments to the Federal Rules?, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 241,
246 (1953). Judge Clark emphasized the importance of pretrial procedures over formalized
complaints and special pleading by reasoning as follows:
The purpose [of the Federal Rules] was rather to get away from the welter
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encompassed in the Federal Rules, there is no need to resort to
heightened pleading to curb frivolous litigation." 6
Beginning with Rule 1, the Federal Rules inform that all Rules
"shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."237 Thus, the starting
point must be to concentrate on efficient and just solutions to curtail
costs of litigation. Once a complaint is filed consistent with Rule 8's
instruction to provide averments in a "simple, concise, and direct"
manner,"8 the Federal rules permit defendants to respond in four
distinct ways.
First, defendants may do absolutely nothing. Failure to respond
to a properly served complaint, however, is risky and can result in
a default judgment."' Default allows defendants who believe that
jurisdiction is not properly obtained to simply ignore the case until
judgment is rendered. At that point, defendants can raise limited
collateral attacks to the judgment-attacks generally isolated to
jurisdictional matters. 4 ' Default is both disfavored and of ex-
tremely limited value in federal practice.24'
The second option available to defendants is the Rule 12(b)
motion. While the Federal Rules explicitly omit challenges based on
of details required in some jurisdictions and to follow the more generalized
statements of some states and, also, of the general (as distinguished from
the special) pleading of the common law. The various [federal] rules all
intermesh to the end; the complaint rule is not necessarily the most
important, but others carry forward this idea. These include the rules
supporting general pleading, limiting the nature of objections to plead-
ings, providing for amendments requiring plain error for reversal, for
discovery, pretrial and summaryjudgment (aimed at quick reaching of the
merits, whatever the formal pleadings), and, especially important, the
Appendix of Forms.
Id.
2 See Clark, Federal Rules in State Practice, supra note 233, at 524. Judge Clark
conceded that the Federal Rule "system does recognize and rely upon the key importance of
the trial judge. It gives him power and means to run his court well; it can and does aid, but
cannot create, judicial skill and competence." Id.
237 FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
m3 Id. 8(e)(1).
239 See id. 55(a) ("When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought
has failed to plead or otherwise defend ... the clerk shall enter the party's default.").
2o Perhaps the most renowned example ofajurisdictional challenge to a defaultjudgment
is Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer is a difficult, but staple, component of most
first-year legal studies in Federal Civil Procedure.
241 10A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 229, § 2693.
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"demurrers, pleas, and exceptions for insufficiency of a pleading,"2 42
Rule 12 provides litigants with modern equivalents to these
antiquated pleading motions.243  Rule 12 allows defendants to
challenge jurisdictional matters, venue, and service of process.24
Rule 12 also permits defendants to challenge the complaint itself for
failure to provide a minimally acceptable form of notice by filing a
Rule 12(e) Motion for More Definite Statement. 245  Due to the
simplified pleading design of Rule 8, Rule 12(e) motions are
disfavored and not likely to find solace before the typical federal
judge.246 Judge Clark was highly opposed to the pleading motions
contained in Rule 12.247 His concern was that Rule 12 would simply
perpetuate the dilatory abuses experienced under the common-law
and code pleading systems of the past. Nonetheless, Rule 12
remains an integral part of the Federal Rules' structure. The last
option under Rule 12 is the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.248
Under Rule 12(b)(6), defendants may file a Motion to Dismiss for
"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."2 4' Rule
12(b)(6) motions challenge the legal sufficiency of a
242 FED. R. Civ. P. 7(c).
2 Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, supra note 193, at 82 ("Lawyers who have
objected to any need of the Federal Rules in their own jurisdictions have pointed out with a
good deal of reason that this is merely the old plea in abatement, the demurrer, and the plea
in bar under a different name.").
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), 12(b)(4), and 12(b)(5).
24' Id. 12(e). Rule 12(e) provides in pertinent part as follows: "If a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be
required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement
before interposing a responsive pleading." Id.
244 This statement is particularly true under Judge Clark's vision of Rule 12. In a rather
stern challenge to the use of Rule 12 motion to amplify pleadings, Judge Clark admonished:
After all, under the present scheme the pleadings are not the place to
obtain particularization of the case. The general objection that no claim
for relief or defense has been stated would, of course, still be open and is
all that is necessary. If a claim or defense is legally stated, then the
matter of particularization should be foregone. The parties are protected
by discovery, pre-trial and summary judgment.
Clark, Simplified Pleading, supra note 193, at 83.
247 Id. Judge Clark was very critical of Rule 12 pleading motions. Challenging the Rule
12(e) Motion for More Definite Statement, Judge Clark wrote that "[t]his, unfortunately, has
proved somewhat of an invitation to counsel once more to seek for particularization, and
hence for admissions from the opponent on the paper pleadings." Id.
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
249 id.
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claim-essentially whether the facts as alleged, if believed and
taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, amount to a legally
cognizable action against the defendant."' Thus, Rule 12(b)(6)
motions will rarely restrain the frivolous medical malpractice claim
unless: (1) The defendant is a legally improper defendant, or
(2) there is no existing cause of action for the alleged wrongful
conduct.
The third available option under the federal system is to respond
to the complaint "in short and plain terms."2"' In responding under
Rule 8, defendants simply push the proceedings to the next stage of
discovery and pretrial motions by filing all of their defenses,
affirmative defenses, and counterclaims in a single pleading referred
to as the answer. 2  Accordingly, the filing of an answer does little
to evade or restrict frivolous litigation.
The fourth and most viable option for weeding out frivolous
lawsuits in the early stages of litigation is a Rule 56 Motion for
Summary Judgment.25 Unlike Motions to Dismiss filed pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6), Motions for Summary Judgment allow courts to
consider the parties' evidence to discern whether there is a factual
dispute between the parties that precludes the entry of judgment
without resorting to trial.254 Motions for Summary Judgment may
250 Conley v. Gibson remains the seminal case in 12(b)(6) jurisprudence, involving a legal
challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In Conley, the
Supreme Court articulated the standard governing 12(b)(6) motions, which remains valid
today:
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state
a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Id.; see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14 (2002) ("Given the Federal
Rules' simplified standard for pleading, '[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear
that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the
allegations.'" (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984))).
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b). In addition, defendants should be advised to raise all affirmative
defenses and compulsory counterclaims then available contemporaneously with the answer.
Id. 8(c); see also id. 13(a).
252 Unlike the common-law system that involved pleas, replies, demurrers, rebutters, and
surrebutters, the Federal Rules do not generally require a reply once the original complaint
and answer are filed. See id. 7 (stating "[tihere shall be a complaint and an answer").
25 Id. 56.
Id. 56(c). Rule 56(c) provides in pertinent part as follows:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
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be filed by the defendant at any time after service of the complaint
and can even be filed contemporaneously with the answer.255 Thus,
concerns that a claim is legally frivolous and completely unsubstan-
tiated should be resolved quite readily under Rule 56 without
extravagant expense or delay.256 Either the patient was treated by
this physician at this hospital or she was not. Either the patient
suffered an injury and can substantiate that injury with admissible
evidence or she cannot. Either the act, as alleged, violates profes-
sional norms or it does not. To be frivolous, there can be no doubt
about the testimony and evidence. Essentially, the case will be one-
sided, and the Motion for Summary Judgment should provide a
quick remedy to avoid abuse. Although Rule 56 permits plaintiffs
to request limited discovery if a defendant files a Motion for
Summary Judgment prior to the close of discovery, this section of
the Rule is discretionary and subject to the judge's control.257
Properly invoked, summary judgment provides further stopgap
against frivolous filings and authorizes the judge to dismiss a case
well before expenditures become excessive.258
Proponents of medical malpractice reform underplay the inherent
remedies currently available within the federal system. Defense
lawyers are undoubtedly familiar with the federal courts' penchant
for summary judgment disposition, particularly in light of the 1986
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
Id.
25 Id. 56(b). Rule 56(b) further provides that: "A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted . . . may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part
thereof." Id.
2 See Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58
MICH. L. REv. 6, 12 (1959-60) (observing that "It]he system has proved itself highly operable
and a necessary corollary to the general (as opposed to special) pleading planned generally
in modem procedure").
25' FED. R. CIv. P. 56(f).
25' See Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83
YALE L.J. 745, 746 (1974) ("The motion for summary judgment has become the first real
opportunity for identifying factually deficient claims or defenses.").
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trio of Supreme Court cases broadening the applicability of sum-
mary judgment." 9
Finally, beyond the initial four options available to defendants,
the Federal Rules permit judges to take early control of case
management through discovery proceedings and scheduling.26 ° Rule
26 requires parties, including those in medical malpractice cases, to
confer before the Rule 16 scheduling conference to discuss such
matters as discovery and initial disclosures.2"' Both Rule 26 and
Rule 16 empower the court to penetrate the pleadings if the judge
suspects a frivolous or meritless case.26 2 Rule 16 provides in
pertinent part that the court:
may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties
and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a
conference or conferences before trial for such purposes
as
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the
case will not be protracted because of lack of manage-
ment;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case.263
'9 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986)
(requiring plaintiffs to offer more persuasive evidence in support of claims than normally
necessary); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (finding that "the plain
language of Rule 56(e) mandates [ I the entry of summary judgment... against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the evidence of an element essential to that
party's case"); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) ("[A] ruling on a
motion for summary judgment . . . necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary
standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.").
260 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (allowing for pretrial and scheduling conferences).
261 Id. 26(f). Initial disclosures are required in most cases under the Federal Rules
pursuant to Rule 26(a). See id. 26(a)(1) (requiring four distinct items that must be proffered
by parties prior to any request for such information). However,judges may exempt individual
cases from these spontaneous disclosures--or discovery that is exchanged without inquiry.
Id. Rule 26(a) evinces the movement toward merits-based determinations by mandating that
parties exchange certain limited information without resort to costly discovery devices such
as interrogatories or requests for production. Id. 26(a)(1)(A)-(D).
262 See Charles E. Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 163
(1956) (stating that Rule 16 "has been the most popular of all the Federal Rules").
263 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a).
1017
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
Likewise, Rule 26 allows the judge to delimit discovery upon belief
that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that
is more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportu-
nity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties'
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery
in resolving the issues. The court may act upon its own
initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion
under Rule 26(c).2"
Considering the elaborate and extensive procedural protections
available to defendants under the Federal Rules, it is surprising
that litigants remain fixated on the minimal pleading requirements
as a target for reform.265 The framework of the Federal Rules
provides sufficient safeguard against frivolous litigation. In
addition to the foregoing provisions, which, acting in concert,
provide abundant resources against frivolous lawsuits, there are
additional punitive provisions available under the Federal Rules
and federal statutes to protect against abusive litigation tactics.
Lawyers are acutely aware of the Rule 11 requirements attendant
24Id. 26(b)(2).
265 Clark, Handmaid of Justice, supra note 171, at 318. Judge Clark emphasized the
important design of the Federal Rules in leading to quick and efficient resolution of disputes
as follows:
Attempted use of the pleadings as proof is now less necessary than ever
with the development of two devices to supply such elements of proof as
may be necessary before trial. These are discovery and summary
judgment, both the subject of extensive provisions in the new rules....
[Summary judgment] can therefore accomplish what pleadings cannot.
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to their signature on all pleadings and motions.266 The discovery
provisions mandate similar verification and provide sanctions for
violators.2" ' Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 imposes monetary sanctions
against any attorney who "unreasonably and vexatiously" protracts
litigation.268
Thus, despite the clamor for pleading reform, the original design
of Judge Clark and the Advisory Committee remains capable of
securing justice for those wrongfully sued.269 Insistence on addi-
tional procedural barriers suggests either a distrust of federal
judges or a disdain for medical malpractice litigation that eclipses
the Federal Rules' system. In other words, physicians and their
advocates must believe that their cases are sufficiently special and
26 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b), which applies to both lawyers and unrepresented parties,
provides that:
Ibly presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or
later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney
or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances, -
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information
and belief.
Id. Subsection (c) describes the possibilities for and the spectrum of possible sanctions for
violation of the Rule. Id. 11(c).
'7 Id. 26(g). Rule 26(g) is the Rule 11 equivalent for discovery and governs both lawyers
and unrepresented parties. Subsection (g)(2) requires a signature from the lawyer or
unrepresented party affirming that the requests or responses are made in good faith,
consistent with the Federal Rules, and "not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." Id.
26(g)(2)(B). By design, Rule 26(g) should help avoid frivolous and costly expenditures in
litigation.
2"8 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides in pertinent part as follows: "Any attorney or other person
admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States ... who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct."
219 See Clark, Handmaid of Justice, supra note 171, at 315 ("Special pleading, in other
words, just does not work. It never has; it cannot be expected to in the future.").
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different to justify disturbing the balance of a procedural system
that has remained intact and effectual for nearly seventy years.
This belief, however loudly and forcefully presented, is simply
misguided. Medical malpractice remains a legitimate concern in our
country. But the fortitude of support for this purported crisis does
not authenticate the continued efforts to disturb the balance of the
Federal Rules. Rather, resort to the existing rules and a clamoring
for their proper application provides the necessary fix.
E. NO ROOM FOR THE "BIG CASE"
Neither the Federal Rules nor the Supreme Court has found
occasion to preempt the unequivocal mandate of Rule 8. Plainly put,
there are no exceptions. There are no exceptions for antitrust, civil
rights, copyright, defamation, employment law, or patent cases. °
And there is certainly no exception for the average medical malprac-
tice case based upon acts of negligence.27'
The only possible avenue for change is through the amendment
process of the Federal Rules. State legislatures cannot impose
heightened pleading requirements in federal court through legisla-
tive mandate without returning to the unworkable days of the
Conformity Act. And this result is not permitted under the Rules
Enabling Act.272 Further, states are not in a proper position to
structure pleading requirements for federal cases. For these
reasons, under the authority of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
states are relegated to promulgating state-specific substantive law,
while procedure remains squarely within the federal domain.
Although states are reacting to a perceived societal quandary in
270 Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 991 F.2d 417, 418 (7th Cir. 1993) (copyright); Cimijotti v.
Paulsen, 219 F. Supp. 621,622-23 (N.D. Iowa 1963) (defamation); see also supra notes 1-4 and
accompanying text.
271 See Form 9, Appendix of Forms, FED. R. Civ. P. (prescribing bare requirements for
cases grounded in negligence). Form 9, which was referenced directly in Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., "simply states in relevant part: 'On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called
Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle
against plaintiff who was then crossing said highway.'" 534 U.S. 506, 513 n.4 (2002).
272 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (empowering the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of
practice and procedure in federal district courts and courts of appeals). See also FRIEDENTHAL
ETAL., supra note 188, at 210 (noting that Rules Enabling Act "authorized the Supreme Court
to draft and promulgate an independent set of procedural rules for the federal courts").
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medical malpractice litigation,273 pleading rules in diversity cases
have never depended on the type of case initiated. Careful insight
into the varied state pleading statutes and the inconsistent
treatment of heightened pleading requirements by federal courts, as
analyzed above, merely underscores this point. As Judge Clark so
eloquently noted: In fact in the case of a real dispute, there is no
substitute anywhere for a trial. To attempt to make the pleadings
serve as such a substitute is in very truth to make technical forms
the mistress and not the handmaid of justice. 4
V. THE PROPER SOLUTION: ADHERENCE TO THE EXISTING
FEDERAL RULES IS JUST WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED
Simplicity in pleading is the grand design of the Federal Rules.
The current medical malpractice pleading dilemma poses a direct
challenge to the historical preference for notice pleading. Courts
that have ignored or underplayed the tension that heightened
pleading and affidavit requirements impose on notice pleading fail
to appreciate the pedigree of Rule 8 and the evolution of our
pleading system. As courts continue to embark on their quest to
determine whether application of a state heightened pleading
requirement is acceptable and proper in federal courts, each court
should remember three things: (1) the guidance handed down in
Erie and its progeny for determining whether federal courts should
apply state or federal law; (2) the unwavering support of the notice
pleading requirements embodied in Rule 8, as evidenced through
history and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in Conley,
Leatherman, and Swierkiewicz; and (3) the duty to refrain from
altering what is perhaps the most sacred Federal Rule in order to
achieve public policy purposes without abiding by the appropriate
amendment process.
First, in determining whether federal court litigants must meet
state heightened pleading requirements to properly invoke a lawsuit
in federal court, courts should consider the analysis dictated by Erie.
273 See Miller, supra note 28, at 984-87 (discussing "[tihe recent outcry in this country over
the societal costs of civil litigation").
274 Clark, Handmaid of Justice, supra note 171, at 319.
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As noted in Hanna, the broad rule behind Erie is the notion that
federal courts should apply state substantive law and federal
procedural law.275 The Hanna Court illustrated that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, at the least, fit neatly within the category
of procedural law and should be applied unless the Federal Rule's
scope is not broad enough to govern the "point in dispute."276 Any
doubt that Rule 8 is not broad enough to cover all pleading require-
ments in federal court, however, was surely swept away by the
Supreme Court's continual proclamation of Rule 8's power and the
Court's unwavering insistence that Rule 8 cannot be circumvented
via state pleading requirements, regardless of the underlying policy
arguments. 27" Furthermore, the Erie doctrine instructs that when
a Federal Rule governs a situation, just as Rule 8 governs all
pleading requirements in federal courts, courts are not to proceed to
the "relatively unguided Erie Choice," but should instead "apply the
Federal Rule."2"8 Thus, courts should never reach considerations of
whether application of Rule 8 over a state heightened pleading
statute will cause litigants to forum shop or whether citizens of the
forum state would be unfairly discriminated against. Instead,
courts should consider Rule 8, the instigating procedural rule by
which a litigant commences a lawsuit, as broad enough to control
any form of pleading required in federal court. Perhaps the
simplicity of this result was most aptly articulated in Charles
Wright's treatise on federal courts: "The Erie doctrine has very
little application to pleading in federal court. A complaint is
sufficient if it meets the test of Rule 8(a), though it... fail[s] to set
forth the detailed facts cherished in the state system."279
Second, courts should adhere to the history and tradition of
notice pleading since the Federal Rules' adoption in 1938.280 The
clarity of the notice pleading standard embodied in Rule 8 is
275 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
276 Id. at 470.
277 See supra notes 208-28 and accompanying text.
278 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. In such circumstance, the Federal Rule must be applied
unless "the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie
judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor
constitutional restrictions." Id.
279 CHARLEs WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COuRTS 280 (2d ed. 1970).
280 See supra notes 178-207 and accompanying text.
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illustrated not only by the text of the rule itself, but also by
Supreme Court precedent. During the past fifty years, the Supreme
Court has not once, not twice, but three times pledged its full
support for the notice pleading standard prescribed in Rule 8.281 In
fact, the Supreme Court has continuously insisted on Rule 8's
application,282 except in the limited instances of fraud and mistake
provided for in Rule 9.2"3 Perhaps most unique and fundamental to
the Supreme Court's full-fledged support of the notice pleading
standards in Rule 8 is the Court's reasoning behind such support.
Conley, Leatherman, and Swierkiewicz specifically rely on other
Federal Rules to do away with unmeritorious or frivolous claims.2"
Thus, Supreme Court precedent is clear that Rule 8 is the governing
standard for pleadings in federal court.
Finally, even if future empirical evidence shows that the United
States is indeed in the midst of a grave medical malpractice crisis,
and the policy concerns are so deep as to justify a heightened
pleading requirement for medical malpractice actions in federal
court, the only viable option is to amend Rule 9. While Rule 9
currently requires heightened pleading in cases alleging fraud or
mistake,285 the Supreme Court has articulated that all other
instances are governed by Rule 8.286 Thus, the Supreme Court has
clearly warned against mandating heightened pleading via judicial
interpretation, instead instructing that such change "must be
obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules."287
The solution is simple. It is branded on the pages of Supreme
Court decisions and has remained unwavering despite strong and
viable public policy arguments that heightened pleading require-
281 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) ("[A] complaint must
include only 'a short' and plain statement of the claim" (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 8));
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168 (1993) (noting "liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by the Federal Rules"); Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (holding "that the Federal Rules . . . do not require a
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim").
282 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
283 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
2S4 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512; Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168-69; Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-
48.
2m FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
286 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
287 id.
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ments should be instituted. Federal courts must not only rely on,
but also properly utilize and enforce the Federal Rules to attend to
issues of procedure in federal court. The Federal Rules speak loud
and clear that "a short and plain statement of the claim" is all that
is required under notice pleading.' Furthermore, the Federal
Rules make a narrow, specific exception in Rule 9, which requires
pleading with particularity only in instances of fraud or mistake.8 9
Thus, any complaint filed in federal court that adheres to the notice
pleading standards of Rule 8 should be readily embraced and
accepted. Fraud and mistake remain the only exceptions to this
rule.
This simple solution, however, does not mean that unmeritorious
claims will run rampant within the federal court system. Rather,
the Supreme Court has continuously articulated that the Federal
Rules have built-in defenses to eradicate such frivolous claims. 290 It
is up to both litigants and federal judges to ensure that these
defenses are properly utilized. For example, litigants can bring
motions under Rule 12, which allows for both Motions to Dismiss
and Motions for More Definite Statement.29' If litigants choose to
instead file an answer, they are then armed with discovery tools
that mandate prompt disclosure of vital information to the
lawsuit.292 Perhaps most appropriately, litigants can eliminate
unmeritorious lawsuits by filing a Rule 56 Motion for Summary
Judgment.293 In doing so, judges will be permitted to consider the
underlying facts of a lawsuit, thereby dispensing of legally frivolous
or unsubstantiated claims in a prompt, less expensive manner.
Finally, numerous outlets via discovery provisions and sanctioning
rules impart judges with the power to severely limit frivolous claims
within the federal court system. The sum of these Rules equals an
FED. R. CIrv. P. 8(a)(2).
Id. 9(b).
29- See supra notes 233-69 and accompanying text.
291 FED. R. CIrv. P. 12(b)(6), 12(e).
2 Id. 26(a).
293 Id. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,327 (1986) ("Summary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action.' "(quoting FED. R. Cirv. P. 1)).
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already paved avenue by which litigants can ensure that unmeritori-
ous claims are disposed of in a timely and inexpensive manner.
Federal courts, when faced with the issue of whether to apply a
state heightened pleading requirement over medical malpractice
actions in federal court, should follow both the history and plain text
of Rule 8, along with the Supreme Court's consistent precedent set
forth in bodies of law ranging from Erie to Hanna to Conley to
Leatherman to Swierkiewicz. In doing so, federal courts will resist
the temptation to improperly heighten the notice pleading standard
prescribed in Rule 8, instead following the Supreme Court's ultimate
instruction to "rely on summary judgment and control of discovery
to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later."294
2' Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168-69 (1993).
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